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ABSTRACT 
Nonpoint source pollution is recognized as the primary cause of water pollution in 
the United States and has many adverse environmental effects in other areas such as 
Europe and China. In this dissertation research, I examine the role of information in 
managing nonpoint source pollution through voluntary programs and regulatory 
policies. Specifically, I look into the effect of informational nudges, information 
appealing to people to act, and financial incentives to reduce nonpoint source pollution 
through behavioral changes. Also, I investigate the impact of information on nonpoint 
source polluters’ behavior under the ambient-based policy when the environmental 
uncertainty exists at the individual level, and the information about other polluters’ 
action vary. We use three methods to study the impact of information on nonpoint 
source polluters' behavior: a randomized field experiment, a controlled laboratory 
experiment, and one integrated agent-based model. We test the following general 
hypotheses: (1) Informational nudges affect nonpoint source polluters’ behavior, but the 
effect is not persistent when we combine informational nudges with financial incentives 
to affect behavior. (2) Decreased environmental uncertainty leads to more efficient 
allocation of abatement efforts across nonpoint source polluters and better social 
efficiency under the ambient-based policy. (3) Under the ambient-based policy, 
different levels of environmental uncertainty and the ability to obtain information about 
other polluters’ actions affect nonpoint source polluters’ learning pattern and 
equilibrium behavior.  
I find that informational nudges and financial incentives both work to change 
behavior, but they may substitute each other, especially when the financial incentive is 
  
 
small. The ambient-based policy is effective when uncertainty levels vary, but 
eliminating environmental uncertainty leads to less pollution. Different levels of 
environmental uncertainty and information disclosure induce different learning patterns 
of nonpoint source polluters. The agent-based model shows that high degrees of 
uncertainty lead to behavioral differences in the long run given the agents can observe 
other group members’ behavior.  
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PREFACE 
I use the manuscript format for this dissertation which consists of three manuscripts 
and appendices. The composition of three manuscripts follows the requirement of a 
specific journal. The goal of this thesis is to understand the role of information in 
managing nonpoint source pollution through voluntary programs and regulatory 
policies.   
The first manuscript report results of a randomized field experiment which we use 
to investigate the performances of informational nudges and financial incentives to 
change homeowners’ behavior when they manage their lawns.  
The second manuscript uses a laboratory experiment to examine nonpoint source 
polluters’ behavior under the ambient-based policies when the environmental 
uncertainty exists at the individual level, and the information sets provided to the 
experimental subjects vary.  
The third manuscript looks into nonpoint source polluters’ learning patterns using 
an experience weighted attraction learning model. We build up an agent-based model 
in which we calibrate the agents with parameters from the learning model to scale up 
the findings from the experiment in the second manuscripts. 
A conclusion chapter follows the third manuscript. It summarizes all the three 
manuscripts, policy implications of this dissertation study, and point out directions for 
future research.  
The appendices include a survey and other materials we used to collect data for the 
first manuscript and an experimental instruction for conducting the experiment in the 
second and third manuscripts. 
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MANUSCRIPT-1 
The effect of informational nudges and financial incentives to reduce nonpoint 
source pollution: A randomized controlled trial 
To be Submitted to Environmental and Resource Economics, under first round of 
revision 
by 
Haoran Miao a, Simona Trandafir a, Emi Uchida a, and Michael Price b 
a Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island, Kinston, RI 
b University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL 
Abstract 
Policymakers often use voluntary programs to control nonpoint source pollution from 
residential lawns. We run a field experiment to test whether informational nudges and 
financial incentives can motivate residents to choose green-certified lawn care services 
voluntarily. We find that informational nudges spur voluntary behavior conditionally. 
However, financial incentives, especially a small one, to encourage behavior do not 
reinforce the effect of the informational nudges. Our evidence shows that the informational 
nudges and the financial incentives are substitutes. These findings are potentially important 
for state and federal agencies as well as advocacy groups interested in promoting best 
management practices.  
 
JEL Classification: C93, Q25, Q53, D03 
 
Keywords: Nonpoint source pollution, voluntary program, informational nudges,                     
financial incentives, and field experiment  
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1.1 Introduction 
Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution is recognized as the primary cause of water 
pollution in the United States [EPA, 2007] and has many adverse environmental effects in 
other areas such as Europe [EEA, 2007] and China [Sun et al., 2012]. It is difficult to 
control NPS pollution due to its diffuse nature and resulting information asymmetries 
between an environmental regulator and the agents who contribute to the NPS pollution 
problem [Xepapadeas, 2011]. To internalize external environmental damages caused by 
NPS pollution and circumvent the information problems, there are standard regulatory 
policy instruments such as input tax [Griffin and Bromley, 1982], ambient-based 
instrument [Segerson, 1988] and random punishment [Alpízar et al., 2004]. Theoretically, 
they are promising to alter behavior that would inhibit good water quality. However little 
progress on NPS pollution regulation has been made, at least in the United States, because 
of various barriers, including significant political barriers [Craig and Roberts, 2015], few 
experimental designs and heterogeneity of spatial and temporal scales for behaviors and 
measured outcomes [Rissman and Carpenter, 2015].  
Currently, local, state, and federal initiatives in the United States mainly take the 
voluntary approach to stimulate behavior change to reduce NPS pollution. For example, 
farmers in the agricultural area are encouraged to adopt pollution control through local, 
state and federal financial supports [Shortle et al., 2012]. Residents in the urban and 
suburban area often encounter education campaigns which nudge people to take voluntary 
behavior to reduce polluted runoff. Appeals such as “water and fertilizer your lawn 
properly,” “leave clips on your lawn” and “use a rain barrel” frequently appear in those 
programs [e.g., Eisenhauer et al., 2010; Bakacs et al., 2013]. From a broader point of view, 
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policymakers all over the world widely favor the use of voluntary approaches as a way to 
improve environmental qualities [Segerson, 2013]. Though treated as second-best 
instruments, voluntary approaches can be cost-effective in encouraging conservation and 
environment protection with thoughtful designs. Successful examples of those designs 
include payments for ecosystem services schemes under which landowners are paid for 
implementing conservation practices [e.g., Ferraro and Kiss, 2002], or unilateral initiatives 
under which polluters take voluntary actions to reduce pollution [e.g., Ahmed and Segerson 
2011]. 
Inspired by these voluntary programs, we conduct a randomized controlled field 
experiment to examine whether on so-called “green nudges” [Schubert, 2017], can promote 
voluntary behavior to reduce NPS pollution from residential lawns. We also test whether 
informational nudges spur subjects’ non-pecuniary motivation such as moral costs [Levitt 
and List, 2007] in NPS pollution settings and lead to an increase in demand for green 
services. To do so, we impose a cross-randomized treatment in which respondents receive 
financial incentives to cover a portion of the upfront cost of buying green services. We 
postulate that in the field experiment financial incentives can also stimulate the demand for 
green services as the informational nudges can, but it may crowd out the demand nudged 
by the information. 
Although there are many sources of NPS pollution, household lawn fertilization 
represents one of the causes of water quality degradation in many regions [EPA, 2005]. 
According to Milesi et al. [2005], co-authored by NASA scientists, lawns now cover an 
area larger than any irrigated agricultural crop in the U.S. As the runoff moves away from 
the residential area, it carries pollutants, such as excessive nutrients and pesticides from 
 4 
  
lawns, and deposits them into receiving waterbodies. Household lawn fertilization is 
significant nitrogen inputs in the urban waterways [Hobbie et al., 2016]. With proper lawn 
care, residents can reduce the negative impact of runoff from lawns, however [Spence et 
al., 2013]. State and local agencies in the United States have mostly relied on education 
programs and extension campaigns to send information to homeowners and nudge them to 
voluntarily adopt best management practices (BMPs) on private lawns [e.g., Dietz, 2004; 
Kelly et al., 2012; Bakacs et al., 2013]. Although understanding the effectiveness of these 
education and extension programs on the adoption of BMPs is important to policymakers, 
one difficulty in measuring the outcomes of those programs is the researchers’ inability to 
observe the subjects’ lawn care behavior, such as mowing the lawns high or reducing 
fertilizer use. Thus, the leading metrics to measure the success of these programs have been 
based on households’ stated preferences in interviews or surveys towards BMP adoption 
[e.g., Dietz, 2004; Ballentine, 2005]. 
In this study, we advance the literature by examining how such information can 
nudge homeowners to choose lawn care companies that provide lawn care BMPs in the 
field experiment. We develop the experiment around a new certification program by the 
Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (RIDEM) which green-certifies 
the lawn care businesses that commit to a list of BMPs. Specifically, we test how 
information nudges affect homeowners’ decisions to adopt green-certified lawn care 
contracts. We also give real financial incentives randomly to a portion of homeowners by 
offering rebates for green-certified lawn care contracts to check the interaction effects of 
financial incentives and information nudges on homeowners’ choices of green-certified 
lawn care contracts.  
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We partnered with the local green-certified lawn care industry to run the experiment 
and recruited residents in the area serviced by the green-certified companies as research 
subjects. From the experiment, we obtain three indicators to measure the impact of 
informational nudges and financial incentives on promoting voluntary behavior: (i) 
homeowners’ stated WTP for green-certified lawn contracts; (ii) reported willingness to 
hire green-certified lawn companies based on a Likert scale; and (iii) information 
acquisition requirements which mean that the respondents leave their contact details (their 
names, email addresses, and phone numbers) to the green-certified lawn care companies to 
get contacted, including free estimates. Ideally, we would use the uptake of contracts as the 
outcome of interest. However, we were not able to collect sufficient data to test the effects 
on contract uptake. We examine the three indicators above as alternative outcomes.1 
However, we claim that the third indicator of whether or not the subject left their contact 
information is a significant departure from the existing literature because leaving private 
information can be considered a costly action.  
We hypothesize that the informational nudges add a premium to the WTP for the 
green-certified lawn care contracts, increase the stated likelihood to hire a green-certified 
lawn care company and motivate more people to take the first step towards an 
environmentally friendly lawn care practice. Financial incentives would have a similar 
effect to the informational nudges on the reported probability to hire and motivating people 
to take action. However, when we implement them together, there may be the crowd-out 
                                                 
1 We have several conjectures why the uptake was small. First, the companies had limited resources to reach 
out to the subjects who were interested in the green-certified contracts. For subjects who provided contact 
information for the lawn care companies, we passed on the information to the three companies and they were 
then responsible for the negotiation with the homeowners, but a substantial portion of the homeowners were 
never reached. Second, we did not conceal the information who got the financial incentives to the lawn care 
companies. They gave quotes to homeowners strategically. For example, they priced their services higher 
given the potential customers received financial incentives. 
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effect. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to use a field experiment to 
evaluate the effect of informational nudges using both stated preferences and revealed 
preferences together at the specific settings. 
 We find that in our study, on average, the respondents in the informational nudge 
treatment group state a significantly larger WTP for green-certified lawn care contracts, 
but this premium nudging by the information diminishes as the cost of the lawn care 
increases. When we restrict the samples to those who report that they are likely to contract 
with green-certified lawn care companies, the nudging premium is still positive but not 
statistically significant; the decreasing trend over the cost still exists but not statistically 
significant either. 
 We also find that the informational nudges and a high financial incentive 
significantly increase the reported likelihood to seek green-certified lawn contracts. 
However, a low financial incentive alone seems to have limited effect on the respondents’ 
Likert Scales of hiring a green certified lawn care company and adding financial incentives 
over does not statistically significantly increase the stated likelihood after we show the 
informational nudges to the respondents. 
 The informational nudges have a significant effect on nudging people to take the 
first step to ask for free estimations from the green-certified lawn care companies. Financial 
incentives are also great instruments to nudge behavior, but we find evidence that shows 
financial incentives and the informational nudges substitute each other. Only a high 
financial incentive can induce a significantly greater treatment effect compared to the 
nudge-only instrument.  
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We organize the article as follows: Section 2 goes through some related literature. 
Section 3 presents the experiment design and the data collection process. Section 4 
formulates the detailed results. Section 5 states our conclusions and recommendations. 
 
1.2 Literature review 
Nudge theory is a concept in behavioral science and economics which has been 
widely applied since the seminal book “Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, 
and happiness” by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein [2008]. They define nudges as 
“any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way 
without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.". 
Schubert [2017] raises an idea about “green nudges” and considers it as “nudges that aim 
at promoting environmentally benign behavior.”. However, since the exact definition of 
nudges is somewhat controversial and there is no strict line between nudges and incentives 
[Hansen, 2016], we use “informational nudges” and “financial incentives” to differentiate 
the two kinds of treatments in our study. The first treatment offers information, while the 
second treatment provides financial incentives to homeowners to nudge the purchasing 
behavior of green-certified lawn contracts.  
Information can affect people’s wiliness to pay for market goods. Depositario et al. 
[2009] find that WTP bids for golden rice are higher under positive information than no 
information, negative information and two-sided information scenario. Rousseau and 
Vranken [2011] demonstrate that the provision of information on the actual environmental 
and health effects of organic apple production increases consumers’ price premium. One 
study by Aldrovandi et al. [2015] shows that exposing people to two different types of 
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information about how their consumption is ranking creates an over 30% WTP gap for 
healthy food. Consumers even react to the information provided by eco-labeling. For 
example, Stemle et al. [2016] find that Marine Stewardship Council certification 
significantly improves ex-vessel prices of some fishes. 
Information can also nudge consumers’ behavior change. For example, according 
to the study by Mathios [2000], people significantly consume fewer salad dressings with 
very high-fat levels after producers were mandatorily required to disclose nutritional 
content by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act. Bertrand & Morse [2011] show that 
information showing the adding-up effect of loan fees over several pay cycles helps people 
overcome cognitive bias and results in 11% less borrowing in the subsequent four months. 
There are also a handful of field experiments conducted to test the impact of informational 
nudges on quantity and quality of people's energy consumption. For instance, Allott [2011] 
reports that, on average, consumers reduce 2% energy consumption when nudged by the 
Home Energy Report letters which display the comparison of their electricity use to that of 
their neighbors. 
Nevertheless, the effect of informational nudges on behavior is highly context-
dependent, and the effect of different types of information varies. Fellner et al. [2011] run 
a field experiment in Austria to test the effectiveness of various normative messages sent 
to potential evaders of TV license fees. While the “threat” treatment which makes a high 
detection risk salient is useful, neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about 
others’ behavior induces significant behavior change. Costa & Kahn [2013] find that the 
informational nudges could have an adverse effect for some political conservatives who 
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may increase their electricity consumption only because they resent the reports that link 
their behavior to that of their neighbors’.  
When we couple the informational nudges with the financial incentives, the effect 
is even more complicated. The tension between intrinsic motivation (which can derive from 
informational nudges) and extrinsic incentives (which might be offered by external agents) 
is well known among the growing bodies of field experiment literature [e.g., Alpízar and 
martinsson, 2011; Lacetera et al., 2012;]. The recent research by Pellerano et al., [2016] 
uses both intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation to induce consumers’ energy 
conservation, and they detect a backfire of extrinsic motivation in their experiment. 
Extrinsic motivation may have a crowding-out effect especially when incentives are small. 
However, as Gneezy et al. [2011] argue a large incentive may have a stronger price effect 
than the crowding-out effect so that it can promote conservation in the short run. Our study 
serves as field evidence of this argument in NPS pollution voluntary programs settings, 
and our experiment design can also test for the potential crowding-out effect of financial 
incentives. 
Many differences exist between lawn care contracts and standard market goods 
such as healthy food, electricity or drinking water even there are markets for lawn care 
contracts. We do believe those differences affect the outcomes of the survey. For example, 
households have different sizes of lawns which may result in very different stated WTP for 
green-certified lawn care; or some households might have good relationships with lawn 
care companies they previously contracted with which may affect their decision to switch 
to a green-certified one. Thus, we also record lawn care practices and individual 
characteristics in the experiment. By controlling those components as other literature does, 
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we expect to improve the precision of the treatment effect estimation. Furthermore, we 
collect two pieces of unique personal information from the respondents echoing the 
literature that shows the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) Scale and the Self-Report 
Altruism (SRA) Scale are good predictors of pro-social behavior. The NEP Scale is an 
estimate of endorsement of pro-environmental attitudes [Dunlap et al., 2000] and the SRA 
Scale is a measure of altruistic personality [Rushton et al., 1981].  In the online survey 
conducted by Attari et al. [2016], for example, people’s pro-social actions have a strong 
correlative relationship with the NEP Scale. The research by Otto and Bolle [2011] shows 
that the SRA Scale is related to the charity giving, but not to the blood donation behavior.  
 
1.3 Experiment design and data collection 
       1.3.1 Experiment design 
We conduct the research in Rhode Island and neighboring counties in southern 
Massachusetts and western Connecticut. This area is one of the most densely populated in 
the United States and has high fractional turfgrass coverage [Milesi et al., 2015]. The 
urbanization process is still active. When land is transformed for urban and suburban usage, 
a lawn is often planted as ground cover on open spaces attached to houses and buildings 
[Jenkins, 2015]. The importance of neighborhood appearance and concern for aesthetics 
drive residents to water and fertilize lawns frequently and use other practices to care for 
their lawns [Nielson and Smith, 2005]. Significant NPS pollution is generated from those 
lawn care practices, and it is recognized as one of the causes of water quality impairments 
in some area [e.g., RIDEM, 2015]. 
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In 2015, RIDEM started the program to green-certify lawn care companies who 
adopt BMPs to reduce their environmental impact when managing residential lawns. The 
green-certified lawn care companies fulfill a menu of BMPs covering a range of activities 
focusing on efficient turf management and water conservation. They protect environmental 
quality by reducing the source of pollution, conserve water and other natural resources and 
contribute to the sustainability of lawn care. Green-certified lawn care companies need to 
adopt additional best management practices to get re-certified every two years. Although 
it is the smallest state in the United States, Rhode Island has about 400 lawn care businesses 
according to RIDEM. Only ten lawn care companies (about 2.5%) were green-certified as 
of January 2017.  
The green certification program by RIDEM is a good example of the state-level 
effort to reduce NPS pollution by promoting voluntary “green services” from the supply 
side. Lawn care companies’ behavior varies largely when managing residential lawns [Law 
et al., 2004]. According to meeting memos with lawn care professionals in Rhode Island, 
those who pursue this green-certification want to fulfill social responsibility and also hope 
that the green-certification will bring customers for their business. Apparently, if more 
customers adopt lawn care contracts because of the green certification, more lawn care 
companies will react to the signal and minimize their environmental impact. As a side goal, 
we conduct the experiment to find good ways to endorse and publicize green-certification.  
We partnered with a state-wide professional landscape association [the Rhode 
Island Nursery and Landscape Association (RINLA)] and three green-certified landscaping 
companies to run the experiment. In contrast to measuring homeowners’ direct supply of 
BMPs as outcomes in regular voluntary programs to control NPS pollution, we estimate 
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their indirect supply through contracting with green-certified lawn care companies in this 
study which is more observable.  
We test the effect of two general treatments in the experiment to promote the green-
certified lawn care contracts: informational nudges and financial incentives. The test 
treatments are varied between participants in a general two-by-two design (see Table 1.1, 
column 1, 2 and 3) and implemented in a structured survey coded in Qualtrics, an online 
survey software. Respondents of the survey are all exposed to the introduction of green-
certified lawn care companies, and two-thirds of them are randomly chosen to receive the 
informational nudges treatment. We introduce a cross-randomized incentive treatment after 
the first randomization of information. Three-quarters of respondents receive financial 
incentives randomly, and one-quarter of them receive none. To differentiate the effect of 
different informational nudges and different level of financial incentives, we implement 
two types of nudges and two levels of incentives in the experiment (see Table 1.1, column 
4, 5 and 6 for more details).  
The subjects are first introduced to RIDEM’s Green Certification Program and the 
green-certified lawn care companies  (page 130, Appendix I). The first segment introduces 
the history of the green certification program and some BMPs conducted by lawn care 
companies using bullet points. The second segment reinforces the contents of the bullet 
points using an infographic developed for this experiment by a professional designer. The 
third segment attaches a few reputable sources about BMPs for lawn care practices from 
three state universities (the University of Massachusetts, the University of Connecticut and 
the University of Rhode Island). Based on results of the report about lawn care behavior 
[Eisenhauer et al., 2010], we design another infographic (Nudge 1) that contains the salient 
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information about the relationship between lawn care practices and water quality. We 
vision that salient information would increase homeowners’ moral cost and thus change 
their behavior. We display Nudge 1 to all the respondents who are in the general 
informational nudges treatment group. The information such as “Runoff flows into aquatic 
habitats, where, just like your lawn, fertilizer makes plants grow. However, too much 
growth can lead to not enough oxygen in the water, killing fish and other aquatic lives.” is 
shown in the infographic of Nudge 1. We also design another infographic (Nudge 2) that 
displays the information about how many the respondents’ neighbors choose to have green-
certified lawn care contracts in 2016 based on the statistics we obtain from RINLA. We 
hypothesize that social comparison can also change homeowners’ behavior. Half of the 
respondents in the general informational nudges treatment group are exposed to Nudge 2 
randomly. (See the survey in Appendix I for more details about the introduction of the 
certification programs and green-certified lawn care companies and infographics for 
informational nudges.) 
Two levels of financial incentives are designed and distributed to the respondents 
randomly. A low financial incentive covers twenty-five percent of a typical green-certified 
lawn care contract of which the average value is $300 according to RINLA, while a high 
financial incentive covers half of the contract. Due to the limited budget, we cap the low 
financial incentive to $75 and the high financial incentive to $150. Two-thirds of the 
respondents who are in the general financial incentive group receive the low financial 
incentive randomly, and one-third of them are randomly exposed to the high financial 
incentive.  
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1.3.2 Survey Design and data collection 
The survey contains five parts. The first part of the survey includes screening 
questions which ensure the respondents are eligible. An eligible respondent must have his 
or her house properties in Rhode Island and some areas in Massachusetts and Connecticut. 
We include areas in the other two states because Rhode Island has small geographical area 
and many lawn care companies have potential customers there. Also, the respondent must 
be responsible for making decisions on lawn maintenance. We also exclude those 
households that hired green-certified lawn care companies in 2016 from our survey. The 
second part begins with a consent form. In the consent form, we state the affiliation and 
the purpose of the survey. We include a short description and expected time that the 
respondents may take to finish all the questions. We embed some clarification requested 
by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Rhode Island in the consent 
form. If the respondents agree all the statements in the consent form, they may continue to 
answer the survey. The rest of part two asks the respondents questions about lawn 
characteristics and lawn management practices in 2016.   
We display the information about green-certified lawn care companies and the 
informational nudges in the third part of the survey. One-third of the respondents receive 
Nudge 1 randomly, and another third receive Nudge 1 and Nudge 2 together. We ask the 
WTP for green-certified lawn care contracts after the nudge randomization is over. The 
fourth part of the survey is the randomization of giving away incentives. The Likert scale 
question about their willingness to obtain services from one green-certified lawn care 
companies is asked based on different combination of the informational nudges and 
financial incentives. The Likert scale has six levels for this question, from “extremely 
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unlikely” to “extremely likely”. At the end of the fourth part, we ask the respondents 
whether or not they are interested in receiving more information from the three green-
certified lawn care companies that collaborate with us. If they are interested, we then ask 
the respondents for permission to send their contact details to the three green-certified lawn 
care professionals. Demographic questions including gender, age, education, and income 
and the question matrices to tease out the respondents’ NEP Scale and SRA Scale comprise 
the fifth part of the survey.  
 The NEP Scale is designed to gauge the environmental concern of people using a 
survey instrument constructed of fifteen statements. The survey instrument includes the 
statement such as “we are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can 
support.” or the statement “ if things continue on their present course, we will soon 
experience a major ecological catastrophe.”. We ask the respondents whether they agree 
or disagree those statements, and they answer the questions by choosing from seven levels 
from “completely disagree” to “completely agree”. We assign a value of zero to 
“completely disagree” and a value of six to “completely agree”. The NEP Scale equals the 
average of the values of the fifteen statements.  
The SRA Scale is designed to measure people’s altruistic tendency by letting people 
self-report the frequency with which they engage in 20 altruistic acts primarily toward 
strangers. Respondents report the frequencies of the acts on a five-point scale ranging from 
“never” to “very often”. A value of zero is assigned to “never” and a value of four for “very 
often”. The SRA Scale equals the summation of the values of the 20 acts. 
We conducted four sessions of focus groups to make sure the respondents 
understand our survey questions. Group participants were recruited from Craigslist and 
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compensated with $40 for their time. Eligible participants were those who were over 18 
years of age, had a lawn and were responsible for its maintenance. We conducted all focus 
groups at the Robert L. Carothers Library of the University of Rhode Island. During the 
focus groups, the participants were asked to take the survey first and then provide us with 
their feedback. On average, the participants spent 19 minutes to finish the survey. 
Questions such as “Are there any questions that are not clear?” or “What is the message of 
this infographic?” were asked in the guided feedback session following the completion of 
the survey. Participants ‘comments and suggestions were then used to improve the survey, 
whenever appropriate. We also sent the survey to outreach personnel at University of 
Rhode Island and lawn care professionals for further opinions. The survey was officially 
distributed to the respondents at the end of February 2017 and was supposed to conclude 
by the end of March 2017. However, due to inclement weather and the subsequent delay 
of lawn care season, we extended the survey closing date until April 15th. 
 The survey was coded in Qualtrics and distributed electronically. The survey 
respondents were recruited through two channels: Qualtrics panel and local organizations’ 
email listservs2. Qualtrics use by the invitation-only online panel recruitment methods to 
avoid self-selection and professional survey takers. Thus many researchers utilize it to 
recruit subjects for their studies [Brandon et al., 2013]. Our survey was also distributed to 
the respondents by local schools, environmental organizations and local newspapers. We 
reached out to school district superintendents, school principals, directors of environmental 
organizations and newspapers and representatives of city governments to communicate the 
availability to distribute the survey to their email listservs. Five schools, twelve 
                                                 
2 Our study did not reach the sample size needed based on power calculation, however. 
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environmental organizations, one local online newspaper and one city hall, agreed and 
managed to post our survey on their newsletters sending to their audiences routinely. The 
research team created advertisements for recruiting respondents and made minor changes 
according to volunteer organizations’ requests. We offered a $2 Amazon gift card to any 
respondent who finished our survey as a small thank-you gift. The respondents could obtain 
the gift cards by signing their names and leaving email addresses. They could also choose 
to donate the gift cards to the organization that sent them our survey. We attach a full list 
of those organizations in Appendix II. We also include one example advertisement in 
Appendix III.3  
 Survey data were downloaded from Qualtrics and updated in our internal database 
twice per week (Monday and Thursday) during the survey period. The research team 
routinely checked the data, sent out the Amazon gift cards and forwarded interested 
respondents’ information to lawn care companies. We collected 1,736 answered surveys in 
total, 1,000 of these from the Qualtrics panel and 736 from schools and local organizations’ 
email listservs. It is worth mentioning that the 1,736 completed surveys may not contain 
all the variables in this study. It is due to URI IRB regulation that requests that all questions 
except the screening questions are optional in the survey and the respondents may skip any 
questions they want. 
 
1.4 Results 
We use three outcome variables to measure the impact of informational nudges and 
financial incentives on nudging behavior: WTP for green-certified lawn care contracts, 
                                                 
3 The survey procedure, focus group and all related materials that were shown to the respondents, including 
the survey itself, were approved by the IRB at the University of Rhode Island. 
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Likert scale to hire one green-certified lawn care companies and choices to leave 
information to the three green-certified lawn care companies. Control variables include 
household lawn care characteristics and respondents’ individual characteristics. Table 1.2 
lists the descriptive statistics of key variables of this study. We start by reporting the results 
of the respondents’ stated WTP. 
1.4.1 The informational nudges and the stated WTP 
 The average WTP (Median = $200, Mean = $423.92, N = 1030) stated by the 
respondents in the informational nudges treatment group is higher than the average 
(Median = $200, Mean = $416.61, N = 522) in the control group. However, the Student t-
Test (p = 0.88) does not reject the null hypothesis that the two means are indifferent with 
each other and Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.36) does not reject its null hypothesis either. 
Since many factors can affect the WTP, such as lawn acreages or lawn management efforts, 
which may confound the treatment effect, we specify regression models to control those 
potential factors and identify confounders if any. 
 Looking into the data, we find that lawn care spending is a good predictor of the 
stated WTP. Also, we observe zero WTP values for a significant fraction (17.43% in the 
control group, 15.34% in the informational nudge treatment group). Thus, we first set up a 
TOBIT regression model, with the cost in 2016 and experimental design variables as 
independent variables. An interaction term between the cost variable and the nudge dummy 
variable is also included to check whether the hypothesized WTP premium nudging by the 
salient information is affixed to the previous year’s lawn care spending. The first column 
of Table 1.3 presents the results of this TOBIT model. It seems informational nudges can 
increase the WTP significantly (p < 10%) when spending on lawn care is not too high on 
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the lawn care. However, the statistically significant negative slope for the interaction term 
indicates that this premium diminishes as the spending increases. The effect of the 
informational nudges could be negative when the spending is high enough. The NEP Scale 
and the SRA Scale is added to the TOBIT model to check whether the two individual 
characteristics well predict the WTP. We do not find that the two variables statistically 
significantly affect the WTP. The effect of informational nudges on the WTP still holds (p 
< 5%), even in the third model in which we add all other lawn characteristics and individual 
characteristics as explanatory variables. (Other variables, such as income and the variable 
indicating whether households hired lawn care companies to manage their lawn have 
significant effects on the WTP. However, they are not the focuses of the paper, and we do 
not report the results on Table 1.3.) 
 Nevertheless, the informational nudges do not affect the WTP statistically 
significantly after we restrict the observations to a portion of the sample. In the fourth 
regression model (N = 675), we drop the WTP observations if the respondents state that 
they are slightly unlikely, moderately unlikely or extremely unlikely to hire green-certified 
lawn care companies. We can observe that informational nudges still have a positive effect 
and their interaction with the cost slopes down, but the coefficients of the two variables are 
not significant anymore (fourth column of Table 1.3). It suggests that some respondents 
might be nudged to state high WTP even they are not likely to obtain contracts. It also 
indicates that the hypothetical WTP premium for informational nudges in our survey may 
have a gap between the actual one. 
 Taken together, we find that the informational nudges can increase people’s 
hypothetical WTP to for green-certified lawn care contract. However, the effect of the 
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nudges might be different from person to person. Evidence even shows that the 
informational nudges might lower people’s WTP when their lawn care bill is supposed to 
be high. We apply the same analysis to figure out the possible different treatment effects 
between offering Nudge 1 only and offering Nudge 1 and Nudge 2 together. However, no 
significant differences are detected. 
1.4.2 The informational nudges, financial incentives and stated Likert scales 
 The Likert scales to hire the green-certified lawn care companies are used to 
measure the effect of informational nudges and financial incentives together. As stated 
before, we asked the Likert scales question after the respondents randomly received the 
financial incentives. The Likert scales have six levels, and we assign a value of one to the 
Likert scales if they state that they are extremely unlikely to hire green-certified lawn care 
companies and a value of six for extremely likely. 
 We first run a Pearson’s Chi-square test the independence between informational 
nudges and the Likert scales. The result rejects the hypothesis that the two variables are 
independent of each other at 10% level (χ2= 11.02, p = 0.051). Surprisingly, the Chi-Square 
test for the independence between financial incentives (= 1 if any incentives are given) and 
the Likert scales do not reject the null hypothesis (χ2= 1.99, p = 0.85). We further replace 
the financial incentives variable with another categorical one, which assigns value zero to 
the no incentive group, value one to low incentive group and value two to high incentive 
group, in the test. Its result reject the hypothesis at 10% level (χ2= 16.79, p = 0.08), 
however. We conjecture that the two types of financial incentives may have different 
effects in the stated Likert Scales. Thus, in the following regression analysis, we 
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differentiate the financial incentives as the low financial incentive and the high financial 
incentive. 
 We use ordered logistic regressions (OLOGIT) to estimate the treatment effect of 
the informational nudges and the financial incentives since our dependent variables are 
ordered categorical variables and our data meet all the assumptions of ordered logistic 
models. We first run the regression with the design variables as independent variables, 
including the interaction terms of the two treatment variables and the variable defining the 
recruitment channels. The results of the first model (column 1, Table 1.4a) indicates the 
stated likelihood to hire a green-certified lawn care companies is statistically significantly 
higher (p < 0.01) in the groups presented with the high financial incentive, the 
informational nudges, and the interaction of informational nudge and the high financial 
incentive than in the group with no financial incentives and no nudges. However, 
presenting the low financial incentive alone does not change the likelihood statistically 
significant. The coefficient of the interaction term of the low financial incentive and the 
informational nudges is only significant at 10% level (p = 0.051), which indicates that the 
low financial incentive may crowd out the likelihood crowded in by the informational 
nudges. Interestingly, it seems the stated likelihood from the respondents recruited from 
the Qualtrics panel is higher than that reported by the respondents recruited from the local 
organizations’ email listservs. 
We further added the NEP Scale and the SRA Scale into the second model as 
explanatory variables. Both variables have statistically significant effects (p < 0.01, column 
2, Table 1.4a) on the stated likelihood. The results are robust when we add lawn care 
characteristics and the other individual characteristics into the third and fourth models 
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(column 3 and column 4, Table 1.4a). The effects of high incentive and the informational 
nudges also persist with more independent variables according to Table 1.4a.  
We present marginal effects comparison of six interactions of the informational 
nudges and the financial incentives in Table 1.4b based on the fourth OLOGIT model. The 
baseline is no informational nudges and no financial incentives. The results show that the 
informational nudges, the financial incentives, and their interactions statistically 
significantly decrease the respondents’ probabilities of choosing “extremely unlikely” and 
“moderately unlikely” and increase the chances of answering “slightly likely”, “moderately 
likely” and “extremely likely”. For example, the sampled respondents are 10% less likely 
to report that they are extremely unlikely hire green-certified companies if the 
informational nudges are presented (the third cell of column 1 in Table 1.4b). The sampled 
respondents are about 4% more likely to state that they are extremely likely to hire green-
certified companies if we provide them the informational nudges and the high incentive 
(the sixth cell of column 6). Conducting more pairwise comparisons between marginal 
effects of interactions of the informational nudges and the informational nudges, we find 
systemic differences in the effects of the financial incentives conditional on the presence 
of the informational nudges. When we do not show the informational nudges to the 
respondents, three level of incentives (no incentive, low incentive, high incentive) have 
statistically significantly different marginal effects with each other. The results coincide 
with the neo-classical economic model predictions in that more incentives induce fewer 
people to choose Likert Scale 1 – 2 and more people to choose Likert Scale 4 – 6. However, 
when we reveal the informational nudges, the levels of incentives do not have statistically 
significant margins effects at any Likert Scale (1-6) at 5% level.  
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Based on the results of Tables 1.4a and 1.4b, we conclude that the informational 
nudges and the financial incentives increase the respondents’ stated likelihood to hire 
green-certified lawn care companies and the size of the financial incentives matter. 
Predicted marginal effects tell us that the financial incentives do not play a significant role 
in the respondents’ stated likelihood to hire green certified lawn care companies when they 
are exposed the informational nudges. Also, people who are more environmentally friendly 
and altruistic are more likely to show interests in the green-certified lawn care companies. 
Nevertheless, will they act? The following part analyzes the determinants of the 
information acquisition requirements variables.  
1.4.3 The informational nudges, financial incentives and the first step  
 Table 1.5 summarizes the rate of the respondents who want the green-certified lawn 
care companies to contact them and give free estimates. It seems the informational nudges 
increases the action rate no matter whether there are incentives. However, based on Chi-
square tests (Column 3, Table 1.5), the action rate is dependent on the nudge treatment at 
10% level when no financial incentives are provided, not in the cases when we give 
incentives to the respondents. It suggests that the informational nudges and incentives may 
substitute each other when nudging the respondents to act to obtain a green-certified lawn 
care contract. 
 We further use binomial logistic regression (LOGIT) models to identify the 
treatment effects, and we show the results in Table 1.6. The odd columns show coefficients 
of the regressions and the even columns presents the average marginal effects of the 
variables. The experiment design variables are predictors of the probability of actions in 
the first model (χ2= 12.93, p = 0.04). The results (Column 1, Table 1.6) show that both 
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informational nudges, financial incentives and their interactions increase the log odds of 
leaving their contact information for the green-certified lawn care companies. For example, 
the informational nudges can increase the log odds of actions by 0.875 at 10% level 
(column 1, row 3). The probability of taking the first step increases by 6 percentage points 
if the informational nudges are provided (column 2, row 3), which means the nudges have 
more than doubled the probability of leaving private contact information. Adding the 
financial incentives with the informational nudges, however, does not increase the 
probability of leaving private information, which is similar to the findings from the stated 
Likert scale variable. Surprisingly, we also find that the respondents from Qualtrics Panel 
are less likely to act even they stated that they are more likely to hire a green-certified lawn 
care contract (Table 1.4a, row 6). 
 We add the NEP Scale and the SRA Scale in the second model and find that the 
respondents’ probability to take the first step increases when the NEP Scales or the SRA 
Scale increases. Financial incentives and their interactions with the informational nudges 
still have significant effects in this model, but without financial incentives, the 
informational nudges have a limited effect [coefficient =0.778, p = 0.13; average marginal 
effect (compared to the baseline) = 0.052, p = 0.09]. It suggests that the informational 
nudges can have indirect effects on the action rate through NEP Scales and high SRA 
Scales. When we add the interaction terms between treatments and NEP/SRA scales in the 
third models, we find that the average marginal effects increase in the third model by half 
point percent, and the trend holds when we add more lawn care characteristics and 
individual characteristics to the regression in the fourth model. 
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 We further look into the indirect marginal effects of the informational nudges and 
the financial incentives by comparing the predicted marginal effects at specific NEP Scale 
and SRA Scale values. We find that the indirect effect of the financial incentives increases 
substantially when the NEP Scale is high (Figure 1.1). It may suggest that financial 
incentives can motivate homeowners with pro-environmental attitudes. We find no 
statistically significant indirect effect of the informational nudges coming through the NEP 
and SRA Scales. Worth to mention, we cannot differentiate the effect of presenting Nudge 
1 and Nudge 2 together on the action from the effect of showing Nudge 1 alone. 
 The results clearly demonstrate that both information and financial incentives 
increase the chance of people leaving their contact information for the lawn care 
companies. However, the results suggest that they are substitutes when implemented 
together. Evidence also shows that the financial incentives may nudge people with high 
NEP Scales to act and the size of the financial incentives matters. This result seems to 
support the argument by Gneezy et al. [2011] that the high financial incentive may have a 
large price effect so that it can offset the crowd-out effect and increases the action to obtain 
green-certified lawn care contracts. 
1.5 Conclusion 
This study empirically investigates the impact of the informational nudges on 
promoting voluntary behavior to adopt BMPs indirectly to reduce NPS pollution in a lawn 
care market setting. The green certification program by RIDEM integrates BMPs, a list of 
environmental goods, into the lawn care contracts which are market goods. In collaboration 
with the local lawn care industry in Rhode Island, we conduct a field experiment and obtain 
two types of outcomes to measure the residents’ demand for the green certification. The 
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first type belongs to the stated preferences family. It includes the measure of people’s WTP 
for and the reported likelihood to obtain the green-certified lawn care contracts. The second 
type is one type of revealed preferences, and it captures whether individuals take the first 
step towards a green-certified lawn care contracts by leaving their private contact 
information for the lawn care companies. 
The analysis of three outcome variables indicates that the information nudges can 
induce behavior change conditionally. Specifically, the respondents report WTP premiums 
and a higher likelihood to sign contracts when we present them the informational nudges. 
The information nudges also induce more respondents to take the first step to contract. 
However, when we show the informational nudges and financial incentives together, we 
detect that they substitute each other especially when the financial incentives are small. 
Our findings also suggest that the effect of the informational nudges differs across different 
types of people. The WTP premiums diminish as the spending on the lawn care increase; 
the informational nudges have a more significant effect when people have low NEP Scales. 
Conversely, financial incentives have a larger effect when people have high NEP Scales.  
Additional results show that the financial incentives can nudge pro-social behavior 
to some extent, particularly when the incentives are significant. However, when managing 
NPS pollution from the lawns, an environmental regulator has to face many small private 
landowners. It makes the financial incentives unfeasible under a limited budget. When 
incentives substitute the effect of the informational nudges and large financial incentives 
are not an option, the voluntary programs to reduce NPS pollution should focus on the 
nudging strategies by more efficient education programs and offering more 
environmentally friendly choices to the public.  
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Table 1.1: Treatment Table 
General 
Treatments  
Description Portion of N Subgroup Description Portion of N 
Baseline treatment No nudges + No incentives 1/12 
Baseline 
treatment 
No nudges + No incentives 1/12 
Treatment group 1 Nudges + No incentives 1/6 
Subgroup 1 Nudge1 1/12 
Subgroup 2 Nudge1 + Nudge 2 1/12 
Treatment group 2 No nudges + Incentives 1/4 
Subgroup 1 Incentive 1 1/6 
Subgroup 2 Incentive 2 1/12 
Treatment group 3 Nudges + Incentives 1/2 
Subgroup 1 Nudge 1 + Incentive 1 1/6 
Subgroup 2 Nudge 1 + Incentive 2 1/12 
Subgroup 3 Nudge 1 + Nudge 2 + Incentive 1 1/6 
Subgroup 4 Nudge 1 + Nudge 2 + Incentive 2 1/12 
  
  
3
3
 
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Description     N Median Mean Std. Dev 
Panel A. Main outcome variables     
WTP Willingness to pay ($) for green-certified lawn contracts 1552 200 421.5 910.75 
Likert Scale Likert scale to hire one ( 1-6;1= extremely unlikely; 6 = extremely likely) 1591 3 3.11 1.69 
Act Request contact from lawn care companies(dummy, 1= request) 1277 0 0.12 0.32 
Panel B. Experiment design variables     
Nudge 1 Informational nudge 1 (dummy, = 1 if provided) 1657 1 0.67 0.47 
Nudge 1 only Informational nudge 1 only (dummy, = 1 if provided) 1657 0 0.33 0.47 
Nudges 1&2 Informational nudges 1 and 2 (dummy, = 1 if provided)) 1657 0 0.34 0.47 
Low incentive  Incentive 1, 25% of contract (dummy, = 1 if provided) 1603 1 0.5 0.5 
High incentive Incentive 2, 50% of contract (dummy, = 1 if provided) 1603 0 0.25 0.43 
Panel Panel (dummy, = 1 if respondents comes from  Panel) 1736 1 0.58 0.49 
Panel C. Household lawn care characteristics     
Hire Had a lawn contract in 2016 (dummy, = 1 if had one) 1736 0 0.15 0.35 
Cost in 2016 Lawn care spending in 2016 1641 140 367.66 820.72 
Acreage Lawn acreage 1648 0.5 0.7 1.22 
# Practices Number of practices to manage lawns in 2016 1716 4 3.87 2.15 
# BMPs Number of  known BMPs applied to lawns in 2016 1628 3 3.47 1.58 
Panel D. Respondents' individual characteristics     
NEP Scale New Ecological Paradigm scale (0-6)  1534 3.53 3.58 0.56 
SRA Scale Self-Report Altruism Scale (0-80) 1512 39 39.36 12.17 
Belief Number of  BMPs that is recognized as effective by the respondents(0-6) 1616 4 3.56 2.05 
Gender Gender (dummy,  =1 if female) 1545 1 0.65 0.48 
Age Age (categorical variable) 1567 4 4 1.55 
Education Education (categorical variable) 1569 6 5.25 1.62 
Income Income (categorical variable) 1492 4 4.4 1.8 
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Table 1.3: Estimation results of the TOBIT models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES WTP WTP WTP WTP 
     
Cost in 2016 0.957*** 0.955*** 0.845*** 0.848*** 
 (0.0715) (0.0726) (0.0867) (0.0999) 
Nudge 1 125.7* 134.9* 140.5** 92.03 
 (67.87) (69.99) (69.87) (61.27) 
Nudge 1 #  Cost in 2016 -0.343** -0.346** -0.347** -0.249 
 (0.171) (0.174) (0.161) (0.185) 
Panel 78.75 64.39 63.77 17.58 
 (52.21) (58.66) (54.89) (47.50) 
NEP Scale  47.70 40.58 -62.52 
  (39.84) (41.89) (38.53) 
SRA Scale  0.181 -0.426 1.706 
  (1.865) (1.943) (1.483) 
 
Other lawn care 
characteristics 
   
 
 
 
     
Other individual 
characteristics 
    
N 1,544 1,462 1,348 675 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.4a: Estimation results of the OLOGIT models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Likelihood Likelihood Likelihood Likelihood 
     
No nudges # Low incentive 0.296 0.335* 0.256 0.359* 
 (0.194) (0.199) (0.197) (0.205) 
No nudges # High incentive 0.786*** 0.778*** 0.758*** 0.827*** 
 (0.226) (0.234) (0.228) (0.244) 
Nudge 1 # No incentive 0.525*** 0.462** 0.377* 0.397* 
 (0.196) (0.205) (0.201) (0.210) 
Nudge 1 # Low incentive 0.324* 0.345* 0.297 0.381** 
 (0.182) (0.189) (0.186) (0.194) 
Nudge 1 # High incentive 0.677*** 0.652*** 0.645*** 0.627*** 
 (0.200) (0.205) (0.202) (0.214) 
Panel 0.464*** 0.445*** 0.403*** 0.452*** 
 (0.0986) (0.110) (0.110) (0.127) 
NEP Scale  0.773*** 0.822*** 0.713*** 
  (0.0987) (0.101) (0.103) 
SRA Scale  0.0167*** 0.0139*** 0.0176*** 
  (0.00445) (0.00454) (0.00469) 
 
Lawn care characteristics 
   
 
 
 
     
Other individual 
characteristics 
    
Observations 1,590 1,501 1,436 1,368 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.4b: Average marginal effect comparison  
 Extremely 
unlikely 
Moderately 
unlikely 
Slightly 
unlikely 
Slightly 
 likely 
Moderately 
likely 
Extremely 
likely 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
No nudges # Low incentiveψ -0.0792* -0.00811** 0.00206 0.0272* 0.0377** 0.0204** 
 (0.0409) (0.00380) (0.00221) (0.0146) (0.0186) (0.00988) 
       
No nudges # High incentiveψ -0.173*** -0.0289*** -0.00505 0.0494*** 0.0961*** 0.0617*** 
 (0.0441) (0.00848) (0.00458) (0.0138) (0.0245) (0.0178) 
       
Nudge 1 # No incentiveψ -0.101** -0.0117*** 0.00152 0.0336** 0.0495*** 0.0276** 
 (0.0411) (0.00429) (0.00232) (0.0144) (0.0191) (0.0107) 
       
Nudge 1 # Low incentiveψ -0.0977** -0.0112*** 0.00163 0.0328** 0.0479*** 0.0266*** 
 (0.0388) (0.00354) (0.00226) (0.0139) (0.0176) (0.00939) 
       
Nudge 1 # High incentiveψ -0.138*** -0.0196*** -0.000855 0.0432*** 0.0723*** 0.0430*** 
 (0.0409) (0.00542) (0.00285) (0.0140) (0.0201) (0.0122) 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Ψ: Baseline category is the treatment without nudges or incentives.
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Table 1.5: Action rate by treatments 
 
  No Nudges Nudges Nudges vs. Act  (p-value) 
No Incentives 4.76% 10.67% χ2 = 3.19, p = 0.07 
Low Incentives 11.11% 12.13% χ2 = 0.14, p = 0.70 
High Incentives 14.00% 16.67% χ2 = 0.36, p = 0.54 
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Table 1.6: Estimation results of the LOGIT models 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Act Act Act Act 
 Coef. A.M.E. Coef. A.M.E. Coef. A.M.E. Coef. A.M.E. 
No nudges # Low incentiveψ 0.924* 0.0642** 0.904* 0.0640** 1.361 0.0732** 0.329 0.0876*** 
 (0.509) (0.0297) (0.518) (0.0313) (2.722) (0.0310) (2.823) (0.0324) 
No nudges # High incentiveψ 1.181** 0.0922** 1.120** 0.0870** -0.101 0.107** -0.388 0.118*** 
 (0.544) (0.0403) (0.557) (0.0411) (3.020) (0.0415) (3.261) (0.0437) 
Nudge 1 # No incentiveψ 0.875* 0.0594** 0.778 0.0521* 3.714 0.0578** 3.192 0.0687** 
 (0.510) (0.0293) (0.522) (0.0304) (2.965) (0.0295) (2.892) (0.0304) 
Nudge 1 # Low incentiveψ 1.009** 0.0728*** 0.984** 0.0722*** 2.711 0.0776*** 2.677 0.0865*** 
 (0.486) (0.0264) (0.494) (0.0278) (2.472) (0.0266) (2.557) (0.0277) 
Nudge 1 # High incentiveψ 1.385*** 0.118*** 1.396*** 0.122*** 1.466 0.125*** 0.744 0.111*** 
 (0.497) (0.0328) (0.505) (0.0341) (2.734) (0.0330) (2.866) (0.0331) 
Panel -0.350** -0.0365** -0.541*** -0.0556*** -0.576*** -0.0584*** -0.771*** -0.0742*** 
 (0.174) (0.0181) (0.192) (0.0198) (0.193) (0.0197) (0.243) (0.0234) 
NEP Scale   0.692*** 0.0710*** 1.239** 0.0775*** 0.890** 0.0558*** 
   (0.163) (0.0167) (0.484) (0.0173) (0.442) (0.0191) 
SRA Scale   0.0165** 0.00169** -0.00335 0.00187** -0.00843 0.00107 
   (0.00726) (0.000747) (0.0192) (0.000766) (0.0233) (0.000854) 
Treatments # NEP scale         
Treatments # SRA scale         
Lawn care characteristics         
Other individual characteristics         
Observations 1,276  1,200  1,200  1,079  
 Robust standard errors in parentheses for the coefficient column and delta method standard errors in parentheses for marginal effect 
column. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Ψ: Baseline category is the treatment without nudges or incentives. 
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Figure 1.1: Indirect effects of the financial incentives through NEP Scale 
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Abstract 
Ambient-based policy instruments are one approach to regulate nonpoint source pollution. 
A series of experimental studies have investigated the advantages and disadvantages of the 
policy under strategic uncertainty but not environmental uncertainty. This study 
implements a laboratory experiment to further explore the ambient tax policy under 
strategic uncertainty combined with environmental uncertainty at the individual level. The 
ability to observe other polluters’ actions also varies in the experiment. The results indicate 
that environmental uncertainty at the individual level does not affect the overall efficiency 
of the ambient tax policy, but induces under-abatement. Evidence suggests that the 
nonpoint source polluters tend to be risk-seeking under individual-level environmental 
uncertainty when given group incentives. Additionally, we find that the ability to observe 
other group members’ behavior may cause cooperative behavior even in a non-cooperative 
experiment setting. 
JEL Classification: C91, Q52, Q53, D01 
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2.1 Introduction 
Ambient-based policy instruments proposed by economists [e.g., Segerson, 1988; 
Xepapadeas, 1992] have shown promise to reduce nonpoint source (NPS) pollution and to 
increase social efficiency through a series of laboratory economic experiments [e.g., 
Spraggon, 2002; Cochard, Willinger, and Xepapadeas, 2005; Suter et. al, 2008]. Ambient-
based policy instruments do not require the regulator to measure individual polluter’s 
emission level. Therefore, those instruments can theoretically bypass the information 
asymmetry problems between the environmental regulator and individual polluters and 
solve the group moral hazard and/or adverse selection problems when accurate 
observations of individual emissions are not feasible [Xepapadeas, 2011]. 
Previous studies have tested their effectiveness and efficiency and NPS polluters’ 
potential behavior in laboratory experiments in various contexts. For example, Spraggon 
[2004] examines the ability of lump-sum or proportional fines and bonuses to reduce NPS 
pollution with heterogeneous agents. The study discovers that proportional fines and bonus 
(ambient tax/subsidy) are sufficient to achieve group pollution targets, but it also observes 
inefficiency and inequality when the agents have different capabilities to pollute. Poe et al. 
[2004] examine behavioral responses to a few ambient-based policy instruments by 
allowing polluters to cooperate. They find that the participants’ behavior deviates 
substantially from theoretical predictions of non-cooperative settings. They also find that 
the instruments which give a proportional bonus to the groups lower their emission levels 
under a pollution target and thus induce over-abatement behavior. The over-compliance 
behavior also occurs in other experiments] in which subjects are allowed to communicate 
with each other under a set of ambient-based policy instruments. Suter, Vossler, and Poe 
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[2009] utilize realistic dairy farm data to model firms with different sizes in their 
experiments. They find evidence that shows the heterogeneity of firm sizes generate both 
desirable treatment effects and unattractive outcomes under the ambient-based tax 
instrument.  
These experimental studies of ambient-based policy, however, examine its 
behavioral effects only when the participants face strategic uncertainty, that is when the 
participants are uncertain about other polluters’ actions. Several experimental studies 
introduce stochastic components at the group level, which does not affect individual NPS 
polluter’s emission as environmental uncertainty [e.g., Suter et al., 2008, Suter and Vossler, 
2013]. As a matter of fact, the effect of environmental uncertainty under the ambient-based 
policy, especially its impact on individual behavior, have not been well studied since 
Spraggon [2002] reports in his experiment that “the Tax-Subsidy and Tax instruments are 
better able to enforce the standard than the Subsidy and Group Fine instruments with 
inexperienced subjects under certainty” and “the result is robust to uncertainty”.  This study 
explores how ambient tax instruments affect NPS polluters’ behavior when environmental 
uncertainty exists at the individual level using a large-scale laboratory experiment.   
Uncertainty is an essential feature of NPS pollution problem [Young et al., 1989], 
and it is one of the reasons that NPS pollution is difficult to regulate. In a seminal study, 
Segerson [1988] developed a theoretical model that shows that ambient-based policy 
instruments could be used to control NPS pollution in the presence of uncertainty and 
obstacles of monitoring. We can consider uncertainty and monitoring difficulties both as 
information problems in NPS pollution control. However, almost every economic 
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experiment testing ambient-based policy implements monitoring difficulties and strategic 
uncertainty but neglects environmental uncertainty, especially at the individual level.  
Several studies present environmental uncertainty at the group level in the context 
of NPS pollution problems [Suter and Vossler, 2013 and Suter et al., 2008]. Other studies 
[e.g., Cason and Gangadharan, 2013] recognize that environmental uncertainty is an 
important aspect of NPS pollution problems. However, they do not test the effects of 
environmental uncertainty because of the existence of the experiment results of Spraggon 
[2002]. In general, almost all experimental studies examining the ambient-based policy 
assumes that there are determinate relationships between individual pollution emission 
levels and individual polluter’s actions. This study relaxes this assumption and embeds 
environmental uncertainty at the individual level to test the effect of environmental 
uncertainty under the ambient-based policy. 
The first motivation of embedding environmental uncertainty at the individual level 
in our experiment is that the action of one NPS polluter is not the only determinate factor 
of individual pollution emission levels. Other factors affect the emission levels include 
temperature, rainfall, and management parameters [Yong et al., 1989]. The implementation 
of best management practices (BMPs), such as cover crops, contour farming, and 
conservation tillage, is a standard approach to reducing agricultural NPS pollution. But the 
effectiveness of these BMPs are not absolute, and extreme weather events can amplify the 
uncertainty in their effectiveness [Woznicki and Nejadhashemi, 2014].  
The second motivation to test the treatment effects of environmental uncertainty at 
the individual level is to fill the gap of describing decision-making under the ambient-based 
policy. Existing economic theories such as expected utility theory [Von Neumann & 
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Morgenstern, 1944] and prospect theory [Kahneman and Tversky, 1979] describe how 
uncertainty or risk affect decision-making in general. Additionally, Faucheux and Froger 
[1995] studies decision-making under environmental uncertainty. A series of experiments 
testing these theories suggest that decision-making is related to the framing of the 
experiments [ e.g., Cohen, Jaffray, and Said, 1987; Elliott, 1998]. In the literature using 
experiments to examine the ambient-based policy, two studies test the effects of 
environmental uncertainty at the group level [Spraggon, 2002; Miao et al., 2016]. Spraggon 
[2002] compares four types ambient-based instruments and find that environmental 
uncertainty at the group levels does not have significant effects on the efficiency of a subset 
of ambient-based policies. Miao et al. [2016] test the ambient tax/subsidy instrument in a 
spatially heterogeneous setting and use uncertain sensor information to model 
environmental uncertainty at the group levels. They find that the more frequent monitoring 
leads to efficiency gains. However, these two studies model environmental uncertainty at 
the group level and their analysis of the effects of environmental uncertainty also focuses 
at the group level. This study contributes to the current knowledge of effectiveness and 
efficiency of ambient-based policy by adding analysis of the impact of environmental 
uncertainty at the individual level on individual behavior. 
Another contribution of this study is to test whether NPS polluters’ knowledge of 
other polluters’ actions can affect their behavior. Previous studies assume individual NPS 
polluter’s actions are hidden not only from the environmental regulator but also from the 
group members. Experiment protocols only provide ambient pollution information and 
related payoffs to the subject. In Spraggon [2013],  the number of other polluters and their 
payoff are also unknown to the individuals in some treatments. We investigate a different  
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scenario in which NPS polluters’ actions are common knowledge among group members 
but still hidden from the environmental regulator. This treatment is important because 
individual polluters in the field may be able to observe the practices implemented by their 
neighbors. Additionally, studies in the game theory literature suggest that knowing each 
other’s actions may affect players’ ability to learn in noise payoff settings. For example, 
Bereby-Meyer and Roth [2006] find that the subjects' ability to learn to cooperate in a 
repeated prisoner's dilemma game was substantially diminished when the payoffs were 
noisy, although players could monitor other players’ lagged actions. This study further 
utilizes this treatment to explores whether knowing others’ pollution levels may affect 
polluting behavior. 
We design a new laboratory experiment to test the effectiveness and efficiency of 
ambient-based policy by understanding the connections between individual-level 
environmental uncertainty (information disclosure) and NPS polluters’ behavior. In the 
experiment, we disclose the information about other group members’ actions to the 
participants as if they can observe other group members’ actions. We follow the design in 
Suter et al. [2008] but decompose the group uncertainty into individual uncertainty. We 
also vary the individual uncertainty into three levels: certainty, the low uncertainty, and 
high uncertainty.The objective of the treatments is to gauge the extent to which uncertainty 
levels or information disclosure influences social efficiency outcomes and NPS polluters’ 
behavior. The information disclosure treatment block includes two levels: with and without 
information disclosure. When the information is not disclosed, the subjects only have 
information on ambient pollution and related payoffs. When the information is disclosed, 
subjects are given information on other polluters’ pollution decisions in the same group. 
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We find that the environmental uncertainty at the individual level does not affect 
the social efficiency. However, environmental uncertainty increased pollution emissions 
and variation of polluters’ behavior. Also, we find that information disclosure reduces 
social efficiency by increasing collusive behavior.  
  
2.2 Experimental design 
2.2.1 Basic design 
This experiment designs NPS pollution problem in a way similar to the theoretical 
NPS pollution model by Segerson [1988]. We assume I identical farms locate at one small 
watershed and their activities affect water quality in a common pool in the watershed. Each 
farm, denoted by i, can produce output yi (yi ≥ 0) in each period and Farm i can sell its 
output at a price p. The price is assumed to be fixed across all periods. Then p*yi is the 
total revenue of Farm i. The operation cost of Farm i is represented by Ci = C (yi, ai), where 
ai (ai ≥ 0) is abatement effort, Cyi = ∂ Ci /∂ yi > 0 and Cai = ∂ Ci /∂ ai > 0.  
We use ri = r (yi, ai, ε) to denote the emission function of Farm i where ryi = ∂ ri /∂ 
yi > 0 and rai = ∂ ri /∂ ai < 0 and ε is a vector of stochastic variables such as rainfall. The 
function x = x (r1, r2,…, rI ) ≡ x (a, y, ε) stands for the ambient pollution level of the common 
pool in the watershed, where a is a vector of abetment efforts of I farms and y is a vector 
of production of I farms. We assume the total environmental damages of the common pool 
are a function of the ambient pollution level and equal D(x), where D (0) = 0, D’(x) > 0 and 
D’’(x) ≥ 0. 
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If the manager of Farm i wants to maximize his/her profit, he/she makes production 
and abatement decisions based on the following maximization problem if there are no 
exogenous interventions: 
max
𝑦𝑖,𝑎𝑖
Profit = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑦𝑖  −  𝐶 (𝑦𝑖, 𝑎𝑖)                                                                  (1).          
However, from the social planner’s point of view, the maximization problem 
develops to the following expression: 
max
𝑦𝑖, 𝑎𝑖
Profit = −E[𝐷(𝑥)] + ∑[𝑝 ∗ 𝑦𝑖  −  𝐶 (𝑦𝑖, 𝑎𝑖)
𝐼
𝑖=1
]                                                   (2). 
Apparently, the optimization problems do not have the same solutions. For optimization 
problem (1), the manager chooses a zero abatement effort and a production level that makes 
Cyi = p, which equalizes the marginal benefits and marginal costs. In contrast, the solutions 
of the social planner’s problems are determined by the following two first-order conditions: 
{
−E[𝐷′(𝑥) ∗ 𝑥𝑦𝑖] + 𝑝 − 𝐶𝑦𝑖 = 0
−E[𝐷′(𝑥) ∗ 𝑥𝑎𝑖] − 𝐶𝑎𝑖 = 0
                                                         (3). 
 To make the solutions to the problem (1) and the problem (2) identical, we impose 
the following tax [Segerson, 1988; Hansen 1998] is on each farm in the small watershed: 
𝑇(𝑥) = {
𝑡𝑖 ∗ (𝑥 − ?̅?)        if 𝑥 > ?̅?
       0                   if 𝑥 ≤ ?̅?
                                                  (4) 
where ti is equal to  
𝑡𝑖 =  
E[𝐷′(𝑥)∗𝑥𝑦𝑖]−E[𝐷
′(𝑥)∗𝑥𝑎𝑖] 
E[𝑥𝑦𝑖]−E[𝑥𝑎𝑖]
                                                   (5). 
If Farm i’s manager wants to maximize his/her profit when the environmental 
regulator imposes the above tax, he/she makes production and abatement decisions based 
on the following profit maximization problem: 
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max
𝑦𝑖,𝑎𝑖
= 𝑝 ∗ 𝑦𝑖  −  𝐶 (𝑦𝑖, 𝑎𝑖) −  𝑇(𝑥)                                                                 (6).          
 Theoretically, Farm i’s decisions about the production and abatement effort will be 
consistent with the social planner’s optimal solution and meet the requirement to maximize 
the social benefit. Under such policy intervention, the environmental regulator’s mission 
is to measure accurate ambient pollution level when imposing the tax. Therefore, the 
ambient tax instruments theoretically solve the information problems between the 
environmental regulator and NPS polluters. 
2.2.2 Parameterization and Treatment description 
In this experiment, the participants take the role of managers of farms, and six of 
them (I = 6) form a group of potential NPS polluters in a small watershed. They have 
identical profit function, but their emission functions may be different from treatments 
which will be explained later in this section.  
We utilize a 3×2 experimental design which presents six treatments in total (Table 
1). The first treatment dimension is the environmental uncertainty at the individual level. 
We implement three uncertainty levels, which includes certainty, low uncertainty, and high 
uncertainty. The second treatment dimension is the information disclosure, which contains 
no-information disclosure and information disclosure.  
The first treatment dimension is different from the previous literature in that the 
environmental uncertainty is realized at the individual level. We use a certainty treatment 
block (Treatment A and D), which implies participants can choose their emission levels 
perfectly, as the baseline of the first treatment dimension. This treatment block is the same 
as the treatments in most previous literature in that no environmental uncertainty exists. 
The second treatment block (Treatment B and E) of this dimension is low uncertainty, in 
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which participants have individual emission levels with low variation. The third treatment 
block (Treatment C and F) of this dimension is high uncertainty, in which participants have 
individual emission levels with high variation. 
The second treatment dimension varies from the previous literature in that we 
include the ability of participants to observe all other group members’ actions. The first 
treatment block in this dimension, including Treatment A, B, and C, is identical to most 
previous literature: participants’ actions are hidden from not only the environmental 
regulator but also their group members. The second treatment block, including Treatment 
D, E, and F, discloses the action information of group members to the participants. 
  The profit, emission, damage and ambient functions and their related parameters 
for all treatments are shown in Table 2.2. From the table, we can see that the profit function 
is identical across all the treatments and the cost function inside the profit function take the 
quadratic form of the production levels and the abetment effects, which agrees with 
assumptions of the cost function in the theoretical design.  
The emission functions vary based on uncertainty level. In general, it is determined 
by participants’ chosen production levels and abetment efforts and one stochastic 
environmental variable. The emission functions have a quadratic form of the production 
levels and a square root of abatement efforts, which ensure the emission functions are 
convex in production levels and abatement efforts. We simplify the stochastic 
environmental vector ε into one dimension. The stochastic terms are completely 
independent of production levels and abetment efforts and have means of one. In the 
certainty treatment, the stochastic term is a constant which equals one. In the low 
uncertainty treatments, the stochastic term is a normalized (mean = 1) lognormal 
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distribution with a small variation parameter. In the high uncertainty treatments, the 
stochastic term has the same mean as in the low uncertainty treatments, but with a relatively 
high variation parameter. 
The ambient pollution function, damage function, and ambient tax function are 
mostly drawn from previous literature. The ambient pollution function is the summation of 
individual emissions. The damage function is a linear function of ambient pollution level. 
Based on previous theoretical work, a linear function of ambient pollution level in which 
marginal tax equals marginal damage can meet the requirement of the optimal tax. 
We design parameters of all the functions such that all the functions meet all the 
assumptions in the theoretical design (Table 2.2). We let  ?̅? , the threshold of ambient tax, 
to be zero in our experiment which implies we impose tax on every unit of pollution. 
Because Suter et al. [2008] suggest that the tax threshold does not affect the abilities of 
groups to achieve the targeted emissions level and theoretical literature also demonstrate 
that the threshold of ambient tax is an exogenous variable determined by the regulator 
[Segerson, 1988] , we use zero as the threshold to reduce participants’ confusion towards 
the ambient tax.  
The modeling of the stochastic variables is motivated by the fact that nutrient loss 
from farm field is positively correlated with runoff amount. For example, in a series of 
high-frequency sensor data drawn from the research results of North East Water Resource 
Network [Vaughan et al. 2017], the Nitrate export in a watershed in Burlington, Vermont 
in a two-year period is highly correctly with stormwater yield according to an Ordinal Least 
Square regression (R2 = 0.7697). Pollutants on the farm filed could have no significant 
impact on water quality if there is no sufficient runoff. We assume that the volume of runoff 
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is a proportion of the rainfall depth. Based on this assumption, we further presume that 
individual emissions are proportional to rainfall depth. We use monthly summer rainfall 
data in the past forty years in Burlington area [National Weather Service Forecast Office, 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)] to fit a distribution and 
lognormal distribution [ε ~ log N (1.25, 0.5)] is a good estimation of the rainfall data. To 
test whether the participants respond to increased variation of rainfall due to other 
stochastic variables such as climate change, we double the variation parameter of the fitted 
lognormal distribution and keep the same mean to form a new lognormal distribution to 
mimic rainfall events with high variation.  
The basic design of NPS pollution problem in this experiment presumes the farms 
choose between two variables, the production level, and abetment efforts. We adopt the 
idea from Suter et al. [2008] to simplify the participants’ choices by identifying a discrete 
set of production level and abatement effort combinations which together imply a 
management option. One management option is a set of production level and abatement 
effort maximizing the pre-tax profit subject to a specific (expected) emission levels (Table 
3). Based on such transition, the ambient tax instrument looks more transparent to the 
participants. 
2.2.3 Experiment protocol 
 We ran the experiment at the Policy Simulation Lab of University of Rhode Island 
(URI) during the fall semester of 2016. A total of 252 students participated in 21 
experimental sessions. Most of them were URI undergraduate students, and a small portion 
of them are graduate students. The majority of the participants did not have previous 
experience participating in economic experiments. We randomly assign all the participants 
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to 42 groups during the experimental sessions. Each group had six participants. We used 
z-Tree [Fischbacher, 2007] to implement the experiment and record all decisions made by 
the participants. 
 The participants gathered in a meeting room before the experiments began. They 
picked a piece of paper with a seat number to find out where they would be seated. Then 
they had three minutes to read the consent form for the experiment. After everyone finished 
reading the consent form, the lead author gave all participants a brief description of the 
experiment and explained to them what they could do (e.g., they could use calculators 
provided) and what they could not do (e.g., they could not communicate with each other) 
during the experiment sessions. After the lead author answered any questions from the 
participants and the consent forms were signed, the participants were led into the laboratory 
and were seated in front of their designated computers  
We gave each participant a copy of the experimental instruction for the first 
treatment (see Appendix I) before the experiment, and they have ten minutes to read it. 
After everyone finished reading the instructions, the lead author gave an oral presentation 
with PowerPoint slides which emphasized the underlying uncertainty in some treatments. 
The participants also were given several numerical examples and were explained how their 
management choices could affect their profit, the ambient tax, and ambient pollution. The 
first author answered any questions they might have after the presentation. To make sure 
the participants understood the general instructions, they were required to answer a list of 
verifying questions correctly using the computers before they proceeded to make any 
choices in the experiment. The software, z-Tree, checked the participants’ answers 
automatically and informed the participants which question(s) they did not correctly 
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answer. The experiment began after everyone had correct answers. The lead author 
explained the answers further if some participants were still confused by any questions. 
Each participant received one pair of treatments, and we implemented one pair of 
treatments during one session of the experiment. Uncertainty levels were kept the same in 
each pair of treatments but the levels of information disclosure varied. We gave new 
instructions and a new presentation before the second treatment. Each treatment consisted 
of 45 decisions rounds. The participants made one management choice and learned the 
level of ambient pollution, the tax that the environmental regulator imposed and their total 
profit from the round. We disclose the participants’ choices to all their group members in 
treatments with information disclosure. Rounds were independent of each other because 
the management choices and ambient pollution did not affect any outcomes in future 
rounds. 
After two treatments in each session, we had non-binding discussion segments. At 
the beginning of the discussion segments, all the participants played ten rounds of the 
experiment in which the tax was Pigovian-type, and the tax they received was based on 
their pollution levels as if the environmental regulator could monitor their emissions. We 
counted the profits in the ten rounds into their real earnings. After playing the ten rounds 
of the experiment, they were free to ask any questions and gave any comments about the 
experiment. We provided pizza and beverage for the discussion session.  
Each session took about one hour and thirty minutes. The software calculated the 
final earning based on 100 rounds of the experiment, the show-up fee, and exchange rate. 
We paid the participants in cash at the end of the sessions. The average payoff was $22.10 
with a standard deviation of $3.80. 
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In each round, the participants chose from six management options. Their decisions 
directly determined their private payoff, as shown in Table 2.3. However, their emission 
levels were determined by their decisions and uncertainty variables. We assumed that the 
total emission equals the summation of six individual emissions in one group. The ambient 
tax for the participants is determined by the total emission and tax function in Table 2.2. 
For instance, if in one round each participant in one group chooses option #2 and each has 
an individual emission of 2.5 after the stochastic process, the total emissions will be 15. 
Everyone in the group will pay a tax that is equal to 450 experimental dollars. Everyone’s 
total earnings in this round will be 800 – 450 = 350 experimental dollars. 
 
2.3 Theoretical predictions and hypotheses 
Since the participants are not allowed to communicate with each other during the 
experiment, we use non-cooperative game theory to forecast the outcomes. However, we 
do not rule out the possibility that the participants may cooperate with each other during 
the experiment since the experiments are a set of repeated games (the participants may 
figure out that they benefit if everyone cooperates), and information of other players’ 
actions are provided in half of the rounds. Also, we assume the participants are rational and 
risk-neutral when predicting some uncertainty treatments. The predicted outcomes are 
presented in Table 2.4.  
The predicted outcomes suggest that if the participants choose not to cooperate with 
each other, they select management option #3 to maximize their profit in each treatment, 
and the (expected) total emissions equal eighteen. Option #3 is a Nash-equilibrium 
selection in this case. We also parameterize the experiment such that the Nash-equilibrium 
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selections are the social optimum. However, if the participants find a way to cooperate with 
each other, they choose management option #1 to maximize their profit. Thus, the expected 
total emissions are six in each treatment. According to previous literature, however, 
cooperative cases are very rare in a series of experiments investigating the ambient-based 
policy, except under cheap talk or communication treatments. Thus, when we outline 
hypotheses to test, we assume that the participants in the experiment are noncooperative 
with each other. 
Based on the experimental design and the assumptions we make, we form three 
basic hypotheses related to the impact of the ambient tax policy, uncertainty, and 
information disclosure on social efficiency and individual behavior. The hypotheses are in 
the form of the null hypotheses, except Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 1: The ambient tax policy increases social efficiency. 
 Hypothesis 1 stems from the fact that that ambient tax is a disincentive for one unit 
of total emission increase. One unit of total emissions increase reduces each participant’s 
payoff by 30 experimental dollars. Thus we expect ambient tax can increase social 
efficiency since the social efficiency is very low if no such a policy is implemented in the 
experiments that many researchers conducted in previous literature. 
Hypothesis 2: Uncertainty levels and information disclosure do not affect the total 
emissions and the efficiency of the ambient tax policy. 
This hypothesis emphasizes possible differences at the group level. We 
parameterize the uncertainty treatments such that the expected emission levels equal the 
emission levels under certainty treatments. Based on the risk-neutral and rational 
assumptions and compliance results at the group level from previous literature, we 
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hypothesize that the total emissions do not change due to uncertainty treatments and the 
efficiency does not change either. Also, we assume Nash equilibrium behavior dominates 
other strategies even though information disclosure can induce behavior change under 
some game theory literature. 
Hypothesis 3: Uncertainty levels and information disclosure do not induce 
behavior differences under the ambient tax policy. 
Hypothesis 3 tests potential behavior differences at the individual level. Similar to 
the reasons for Hypothesis 2, we do not expect that behavior differences are statistically 
significant when presenting uncertainty and information about other players’ actions. 
 
2.4 Results 
We highlight three key results from the experiment in this section, organized by the 
three hypotheses. 
Result 1: The ambient tax policy increases the social efficiency. 
 We calculate the social efficiency from the view of the social planner. When there 
is no policy implemented in the experiment, we assume that there is no social efficiency at 
according to the results of many previous experiments and every participant select the 
management option #6 as the status quo choice. We follow Spraggon [2002] to define 
social efficiency as “the change in the value of net social benefits as a percentage of the 
optimal change in social benefits from the status quo,” and the mathematic expression is: 
 SE = (NSBactual – NSBstatus quo)/ (NSBoptimal – NSBstatus quo)                       (7) 
where SE is the social efficiency, NSBactual represents the actual net social benefit in each 
treatment and round, NSBstatus quo is the net social benefit when the participants made 
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choices under the condition that no policy is implemented (in our experiment, we assume 
this status quo choice is management option #6 with the emission level 6), and NSBoptimal 
represents the net social benefit with socially optimal behavior (Every participant choose 
management option #3 in our experiment). 
 The first result comes from a simple inspection of the mean social efficiency of 
each treatment with the ambient based tax shown in Table 2.5 (Column 1). The average 
social efficiencies of all six treatments are between 63% and 69%. Though there is no direct 
comparison group in our experiment, previous experiments, such as Suter et al. [2008] and 
Miao et al. [2016], the social efficiency is nearly 0% under no policy scenario. Efficiency 
levels of all the treatments are statistically different from 0%. 
Result 2a: Under the ambient tax policy, environmental uncertainty at the 
individual level increases total emissions; information disclosure decreases total emissions 
in certainty treatments. 
 We can observe the impact of the individual uncertainty and information disclosure 
on emissions in the first column in Table 2.5. Average total emissions of Treatments A and 
D (certainty treatments) is lower than the predicted emission. In contrast, average total 
(expected) emissions of Treatment B, C, E and F (uncertainty treatments) is higher than 
the predicted emissions. However, the effect of information disclosure is not systematic. 
When there is no environmental uncertainty, information disclosure decreases total 
emissions, but the effect does not hold when the payoff is noisy. 
We use a panel data approach with a random effect to formally test the effect of 
individual uncertainty and information disclosure. We specify the econometric model as 
𝑥𝑔𝑡 = ∑ βTT𝑔𝑡
F
T=A + 𝑣𝑔 +  𝜀𝑔𝑡                                            (8) 
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where 𝑥𝑔𝑡 is the total emission of group g in round t, T𝑔𝑡 are the treatment dummies, βT 
are the coefficients of each treatment, 𝑣𝑔 is the group specific error term and 𝜀𝑔𝑡 is the 
standard error over group and period. 
Based on a post regression analysis, all the total emissions are different from eighteen 
which is the predicted pollution level and the social optimum. However, systematic 
differences exist between uncertainty and certainty treatments. The average total emissions 
of certainty treatments are statistically significantly below the social optimum. It seems a 
portion of people tried to cooperate with their group member to reduce their tax burden 
during the experiment by choosing management option #1 and #2. The average expected 
total emissions of uncertainty treatments are statistically significantly above the social 
optimum. We can see that the participants in uncertainty chose management options which 
induced expected emissions levels greater than three more often than the participants in 
certainty treatments. Thus the uncertainty treatments systematically induce higher emission 
levels than certainty treatment. Worth to mention, increasing the level of uncertainty does 
not change the overall emissions statistically significantly. 
 We cannot find systematic differences between treatments with or without perfect 
information of other group members’ past actions by eyeball-testing of the mean total 
emissions of all treatments (Table 2.5, column 1).  However, from the above econometric 
model, we find that information disclosure induces statistically significant low emissions 
in certainty treatments, but not in uncertainty treatments. In another word, in an 
environment without uncertainty, the participants tend to be more cooperative when they 
can observe other group members’ past actions. However, when the environment is 
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uncertain, or the payoffs are noisy, information disclosure does not increase cooperative 
behavior. 
Taken together, the environmental uncertainty at the individual level increases total 
emissions, compared with the treatments without environmental uncertainty. The ability to 
observe other group members’ past actions have a great impact on the total emissions when 
no environmental uncertainty exists.  
Result 2b: Under the ambient tax policy, environmental uncertainty at the 
individual level does not affect the overall social efficiency, however, increasing the level 
of uncertainty statistically significantly reduces the allocative efficiency; Information 
disclosure reduces overall social efficiency.  
In this part, we test the impact of uncertainty and information disclosure on social 
efficiency (SE) together with its decompositions: allocative efficiency (AE) and emission 
efficiency (EE). The decomposition follows Suter et al. [2008] and the product of AE and 
EE equals the SE.  A low AE indicates that there is an imperfect allocation of individual 
emissions. A low EE means the aggregate emissions deviate far from the optimal level. AE 
is equal to100% if individual emissions are perfectly allocated. In the setting of this 
experiment, AE is 100% if all group members’ choices are symmetric. EE is equal to 100% 
if overall emissions are equal to eighteen. 
We specify the following random effect models to test the effect of uncertainty and 
information disclosure: 
SE𝑔𝑡(AE𝑔𝑡, EE𝑔𝑡) = α +  ∑ (γU ∗ Uncertainty𝑔𝑡
U )3U=1 + ∑ (θInfo ∗
2
Info=1
Information𝑔𝑡
Info) + ∑ ∑ (ψU−Info ∗ Uncertainty𝑔𝑡
U2
Info=1
3
𝑈=1 ∗ Information𝑔𝑡
Info) + 𝑣𝑔 +
 𝜀𝑔𝑡           (9) 
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where SEg𝑡 ((AE𝑔𝑡, EE𝑔𝑡) is the social efficiency (the allocative efficiency, the emission 
efficiency) of group g in round t, Uncertainty𝑔𝑡
U  are the uncertainty dummies of group g in 
round t (1 represents certainty, 2 represents low uncertainty and 3 represents high 
uncertainty) Information𝑔𝑡
Info  are the information dummies of group g in round t (1 
represents no information, and 2 represents with information), γU, θInfo, and ψU−Infoare 
the coefficients of each dummy variable,  𝑣𝑔 is the group specific error term and 𝜀𝑔𝑡 is the 
standard error over group and period. 
 We show the results of the above models in Table 2.6. As expected, the first column 
indicates that the environmental uncertainty at the individual level does not affect the 
overall social efficiency. However, uncertainty, especially high uncertainty, reduces the 
allocative efficiency, which means uncertainty encourage heterogeneous behavior among 
the experiment participants. The impact of information disclosure on the efficiency is 
different from the predicted results according to Table 2.6. The information disclosure 
treatment has an overall negative effect on the social efficiency, and the major source of 
efficiency reduction comes from the reduction of the emission efficiency. The information 
disclosure increases the allocative efficiency by inducing more symmetric behavior. 
However, it seems the total emissions deviate more from the optimal level when the 
participants can observe other group members’ actions. 
 Interestingly, we find that environmental shocks, a negative payoff in round t, 
increase emissions in round t +1, using a similar regression model in which the total 
emission is the dependent variable and environmental shock is an added independent 
variable. In the nonbinding communication with the participants, a large portion of them 
indicated that they expected the shocks would not come back so that they increased their 
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pollution level in the next round. Although we emphasized that rounds were independent 
with each other during the experiment, the participants in uncertainty treatments acted as a 
gamblers’ in a game and had wrong beliefs such as gambler’s fallacy. 
Result 3: Under the ambient tax policy, environmental uncertainty at the individual 
level decreases over-abatement behavior and increases under-abatement behavior; 
information disclosure rises over-abatement behavior. 
Result 1 reveals that uncertainty and information disclosure may affect the total 
emissions. This result looks into the possible behavior differences from individual choices. 
Since only six management choices are available to choose from by the experiment 
participants and management choices, from #1 to #6, induces increasing (expected) 
emissions, we treat the variable (individual decisions) as ordered discrete choices. We 
model the individual decisions with a random-effects ordered logistic model, using 
uncertainty dummy variables, information disclosure dummy variables and their 
interaction terms as the explanatory variables.  
The marginal effects of uncertainty and information disclosure treatments on 
individual choices are presented in Table 2.7. The estimation results (Row 1 and 2, Table 
2.7) suggest that environmental uncertainty at the individual level, no matter it is at the low 
or high uncertainty level, statistically significantly reduces the over-abetment choices 
(management option #1 and #2) and increases the under-abatement choices (management 
option #4, #5 and #6). It seems the participants’ choices are transferred from one type of 
sub-optimal choices to the other type of sub-optimal choices when uncertainty treatments 
are imposed in the experiment. We did not find systematic choices differences between 
two uncertainty levels. 
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Also, we find that information disclosure increases the possibilities of over-
abatement choices (management option #1 and #2).  However, information disclosure does 
not affect the Nash-equilibrium and under-abatement selections (Table 2.7, row 3). Taken 
together, when no environmental uncertainty exists, and the participants can observe other 
group members choices, the participants are more likely to choose to over abate which 
indicates that they try to cooperate with each other even their choices are not the Nash-
equilibrium selection. 
We further compare the individual choices during the experiment with the choices 
in the post-experiment discussion in which the participants face a Pigovian-type tax. We 
find that under-abatement choices significantly decrease in the uncertainty treatments. 
Based on the discussion with the participants, the seemingly risk-seeking behavior in the 
uncertainty treatment may come from the effect of uncertainty and also the feature of the 
group incentive (ambient tax policy). 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this study, we use an NPS water pollution economic experiment to investigate 
the impact of environmental uncertainty at the individual level on social efficiency and 
NPS polluters’ behavior under the ambient tax policy. This type of environmental 
uncertainty imposes an uncertain relationship between individual pollution emission and 
individual action. The results of our experiment show that the environmental uncertainty 
induces different patterns of NPS polluters’ behavior. Specifically, the environmental 
uncertainty largely decreases the possibility of collaboration among NPS polluters in non-
cooperative settings and increases total emission levels. As the uncertainty level increases, 
NPS polluters’ management options vary. Compared with the behavior in an individual tax 
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setting, NPS polluters are more risk-seeking under the ambient tax policy. We do not find 
the environmental uncertainty has a significant impact on social efficiency, however. 
We allow the participants to have the information about the actions of their group 
member in half of our treatments in the experiment. We find that the information disclosure 
treatment induces a lower social efficiency, compared with no-information disclosure 
groups. The loss of social efficiency mostly comes from the trend of collusive behavior. 
The trend is triggered by simply observing other group members’ action, even without any 
communication.  
The results offer the environmental regulators some insight into the possible 
implementation of ambient-based policies to regulate NPS pollution. To increase the 
efficiency of such kind of policies, they should be aware of potential collusive behavior 
which is a threat to the social efficiency. Also, environmental uncertainty can induce NPS 
polluters to deviate from the target outcomes of related ambient-based policies. Eliminating 
or reducing the influence of the environmental uncertainty on payoff structures is one boost 
to the utilization of the ambient-based policies.  
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Table 2.1: Treatment conditions 
Treatment 
 
Label Information about other group members' decisions Uncertainty Level 
A 
No information, 
Certainty No Certainty 
B 
No information, Low 
uncertainty No Low uncertainty 
C 
No information, High 
certainty No High uncertainty 
D 
Information, Certainty 
Yes Certainty 
E 
Information, Low 
uncertainty Yes Low uncertainty 
F 
Information, High 
certainty Yes High uncertainty 
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Table 2.2: Function forms and parameter values  
Description Function Form 
Parameter Values 
Certainty 
Parameter Values  
Low uncertainty 
Parameter Values 
High uncertainty 
Profit function  
π (yi, ai) 
p*yi - (Ayi
2 + B ai
2) + C 
 p = 6.00, A =0.02, B = 
0.05, C = 350 
 p = 6, A =0.02, B = 
0.05, C = 350 
p = 6, A =0.02, B = 0.05, 
C = 350  
Emission Function 
ri(yi, ai, ε) 
(Eyi
2 - Fai
0.5)* ε /(μ + σ2/2)  
E = 1/3750, F = 4/75, ε 
=μ + σ2/2 
E = 1/2750, F = 2/275, , ε 
~ log N(1.25,0.5) 
E = 1/2750, F = 2/275, ε 
~ log N(0.875,1) 
Ambient pollution 
function x(r) 

I
1i
ir   I = 6 I = 6 I = 6 
Damage function 
D(x) 
H * x  H = 30  H = 30   H = 30  
Tax function 
T(x) 
t * x t = 30 t = 30 t = 30 
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Table 2.3: Profit-maximizing values of production and abatement for (expected) emission levels 
Management Option (Expected) Emissions (r) Abatement (a) Production (y) Profit (π) 
#6 6.00 0.00 150.00 800.00 
#5 5.00 1.46 137.81 796.92 
#4 4.00 2.62 123.78 785.92 
#3 3.00 3.93 107.91 763.81 
#2 2.00 5.69 89.32 724.73 
#1 1.00 8.67 65.87 654.68 
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Table 2.4: Predicted outcomes of group emissions 
Treatment 
 
Label 
Predicted (expected) total emissions 
Under non-cooperative game theory 
Predicted (expected) total emissions 
Under cooperative game theory 
A 
No information, Certainty 
18.00 6.00 
B 
No information, Low 
uncertainty 18.00 6.00 
C 
No information, High 
certainty 18.00 6.00 
D 
Information, Certainty 
18.00 6.00 
E 
Information, Low 
uncertainty 18.00 6.00 
F 
Information, High 
certainty 18.00 6.00 
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Table 2.5: Average expected efficiency of treatments 
Treatment Label 
Expected 
Total 
Emission 
Expected 
Social 
Efficiency 
Expected 
Emission 
Efficiency 
Expected 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
A No information, 
certainty 
16.82 
(3.88) 
68.34% 
(0.16) 
 
89.65% 
(0.11) 
76.60% 
(0.16) 
B 
No information, 
Low uncertainty 
19.03 
(3.30) 
68.99% 
(0.16) 
92.56% 
(0.07) 
74.51% 
(0.16) 
 
C  High uncertainty 
 
18.59 
(3.30) 
62.97% 
(0.16) 
92.57% 
(0.07) 
68.09% 
(0.17) 
 
D Information, 
Certainty 
 
15.97 
(4.17) 
66.83% 
(0.18) 
86.20% 
(0.16) 
78.40% 
(0.17) 
 
E Information, 
Low uncertainty 
18.93 
(4.27) 
66.68% 
(0.18) 
89.71% 
(0.11) 
74.45% 
(0.18) 
 
F Information, 
High uncertainty 
19.02 
(3.67) 
63.99% 
(0.15) 
91.58% 
(0.09) 
69.99% 
(0.18) 
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses (for example, s.d. = 0.16 means standard of efficiency is 16%)
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Table 2.6: Effects of uncertainty level and information on efficiency 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Expected 
Social 
Efficiency 
Expected 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
Expected 
Emission 
Efficiency 
Low uncertainty 0.007 -0.021 0.030 
 (0.039) (0.035) (0.020) 
High uncertainty -0.054 -0.085** 0.029 
 (0.039) (0.035) (0.020) 
Information -0.015** 0.018** -0.035*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Low uncertainty #Information -0.008 -0.019* 0.006 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
High uncertainty # Information 0.025** 0.001 0.025*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) 
    
Observations 3,780 3,780 3,780 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.7: Marginal effects of uncertainty and information disclosure based on the random-effects ordered logistic model 
 Management 
Option 
Management 
Option 
Management 
Option 
Management 
Option 
Management 
Option 
Management 
Option 
VARIABLES # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 
       
Low uncertainty -0.0681*** -0.127*** 0.052** 0.076*** 0.037*** 0.031*** 
 (0.024) (0.040) (0.022) (0.025) (0.012) (0.011) 
       
High uncertainty -0.057*** -0.0289** 0.049** 0.058** 0.027** 0.021** 
 (0.025) (0.00848) (0.022) (0.024) (0.012) (0.009) 
       
Information 0.007*** 0.007* -0.008*** 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.011) 
N = 22,680; Delta-method standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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MANUSCRIPT-3 
Experimental evidence of learning effects under an ambient tax policy  
(To be submitted)  
by 
Haoran Miao a, Todd Guilfoosa, and Emi Uchida a 
a Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island, Kinston, RI 
Abstract 
In studies using laboratory experiments to investigate the ambient-based policies, the 
participants adapt their strategy after many rounds of interaction in some circumstances. 
We conduct a laboratory economic experiment to test how nonpoint source polluters’ 
behavior evolves under different scenarios. We apply the experiment data to the experience 
weighted learning model and find that the participants are mainly reinforced to adapt their 
behavior, and their learning processes vary according to different levels of environmental 
uncertainty. Specifically, the ability to play a strategy corresponding to the most attractive 
payoffs in previous rounds diminishes as the uncertainty level increases. Information 
disclosure neutralizes this effect. We then develop an agent-based model to scale up the 
findings from the experiment. We calibrate the agents’ learning abilities with the 
parameters estimated from the experience weighted learning model learning model. From 
the simulation results, we find that environmental shocks decrease emission level in the 
ABM after many rounds of interactions given that we disclose group members’ actions, 
but we do not observe this effect in the laboratory experiments.  
 
 
JEL Classification: C91, Q52, Q53, D01, C63 
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3.1 Introduction 
In the past two decades, researchers have frequently used controlled laboratory 
experiments to test the efficiency and effectiveness of those proposed policies to reduce 
NPS pollution. For instance, Cason et al. [2003] conducted a laboratory experiment of a 
sealed-offer auction to seek voluntary contribution to control NPS pollution and found that 
revealing the high environmental benefits to the potential sellers induced misrepresentative 
offers. The experimental results suggested that concealing the information of ecological 
benefits may improve the policy efficiency. Taylor et al. [2004] used a similar experimental 
auction method to study nonpoint source polluters’ voluntary emission-reduction behavior 
under a group contract. They found that the group contract could be efficient and effective 
to control NPS pollution, but with limitations. The ambient-based policies proposed by 
Segerson [1988] represented another promising type of policies and a series of laboratory 
experiments were conducted to measure their advantages and disadvantages. Spraggon 
[2002] tested the effectiveness of different ambient-based policies and found that the 
ambient tax and the combination of ambient subsidy and tax may work better than others. 
Cochard, Willinger, and Xepapadeas [2005] had slightly different results in their laboratory 
experiments, compared to Spraggon [2002]. Economists also investigated the effects of 
heterogeneous NPS polluters [e.g., Spraggon, 2004; Suter, Vossler, and Poe, 2009], 
communication [e.g., Vossler et al., 2006], and threshold differences [Suter et al., 2008] 
under ambient-based policies using laboratory experiments.  
Despite the growing issue on this topic, it is not well understood how players adapt or 
evolve toward any equilibrium. In experimental studies, researchers typically model NPS 
pollution problems as finite repeated normal-form games with multiple players and assume 
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that players’ behavior stabilizes in a short period. They use non-cooperative or cooperative 
game theory to predict players’ behavior in each independent round. In most of the 
experimental designs, Nash equilibria are socially desired abatement strategies, and the 
empirical analyses focus on the average treatment effects of ambient-based policies across 
all rounds under different scenarios. Moreover, a few previous studies find that the players 
in the repeated games with NPS pollution settings may not form beliefs which are best 
strategies for them and stabilize their behavior in the short term. For example, Spraggon 
[2002] shows that players’ still change their emission levels after more than twenty rounds, 
even in the promising ambient tax/subsidy and tax instruments. Suter, Vossler, and Poe 
[2009] demonstrate that total emission levels gradually converge to social optimum in 
about twenty rounds. Moreover, Miao et al. [2016] use a laboratory economic experiment 
in a setting with realistic in-stream nutrient transport dynamics to test the effectiveness of 
the ambient tax/subsidy policies. They show that the observed social efficiency increase 
over time in treatments with more frequent information on pollution over time. Also, Miao 
et al. [2017] observe unstable social efficiency after forty rounds of the experiment in all 
the treatments. The behavior does not converge to the Nash equilibrium despite long-term 
interactions. All the evidence suggests that players in the game with NPS pollution settings 
adapt their strategies over time instead of reasoning their ways, forming their beliefs or 
finding their best strategy in a short period. This study aims to fill these literature gaps by 
understanding how players learn to adapt or evolve toward any equilibrium in the repeated 
non-cooperative game with NPS pollution settings.  
Our study also aims to test whether or not adding environmental uncertainty to the 
games with ambient-based policies decreases players’ learning ability. Learning patterns 
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in games with strategic uncertainty is different from the patterns in individual-decision 
making because the games in which each player gains experience contains other players 
who adapt their behavior as they learn experience [Erev and Roth, 1998]. The strategic 
uncertainty, which means one individual does not have knowledge about other players’ 
action, is not the only type of uncertainty in the NPS pollution problems. Environmental 
uncertainty, which is independent of players’ actions, represents one important feature of 
NPS pollution. It could come from a variation in temperature, rainfall, or other stochastic 
processes [Yong et al., 1998] in the NPS water pollution problems. The second motivation 
for the study is that we do not understand learning patterns well in the NPS pollution 
settings under ambient-based policies, especially when the settings combine strategic 
uncertainty and environmental uncertainty. Bereby-Meyer and Roth [2006] show that 
noisy payoff decreases players’ ability to learn to cooperate in the repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma. Similar to this study,  
One important design in most experiments studying ambient-based policies is that 
individual player only knows the ambient pollution level and its payoffs after one round 
and other players’ actions and their payoffs are hidden from the individual. Such design 
assumes that NPS polluters cannot observe other group members’ actions. We vary this 
assumption as a dimension of treatments to mimic an extreme scenario in the field that 
nonpoint source polluters’ actions are hidden from the environmental regulator but 
perfectly observed by group members. As a few studies on public goods games [e.g., Dong, 
Zhang, and Tao, 2016] point out that the dynamics of one player’ behavior can be explained 
partly by other group members’ behavior, we hypothesize that knowing other players’ 
action after one round of game can change players’ learning patterns. 
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Based on these motivations, we conduct a laboratory experiment with 
implementation of an ambient tax policy and a repeated non-cooperative game to achieve 
the goals that we mentioned above. We adopt the classic NPS source pollution setting from 
[Segerson, 1988] and vary the environmental uncertainty at the individual level, including 
certainty, low uncertainty, and high uncertainty. Also, we disclose group members’ actions 
to one-half of the sessions of the experiments. Furthermore, we use the most extended 
interaction rounds (45 rounds) among the studies investigating the policies to reduce NPS 
pollution to check the learning behavior over a long time horizon.  
The core research question in this study is whether subjects form beliefs over time 
or their decisions are reinforced by previous payoffs under uncertainty. To test this 
question, we utilize the experience weighted attraction (EWA) learning model [Camerer, 
and Ho, 1999]. EWA is an appealing model for this study to discover how the subjects 
adapt their strategies with an ambient-based policy because it integrates belief-based 
models and reinforcement learning. We then use post-estimation techniques to compare 
learning patterns across diffident environmental uncertainty levels and information set.  
As the final analysis, we take the parameters from the learning model to calibrate 
an agent-based model (ABM) to scale up and complement the findings from the laboratory 
experiments. The application of an ABM is motivated by fundamental limitations of 
laboratory experiments that experimenters are typically limited in the numbers of subjects 
that can be recruited and the interaction rounds. One may question that different behavior 
patterns may appear if we implement the experiment at a large scale and for an extended 
time horizon. Duffy [2006] argues that agent-based models (ABMs) are good complements 
of human subjects experiment and cheap computer power of ABMs can overcome the 
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experimenters’ limitations. Agents in the ABMs are analogous to the subjects in the 
laboratory experiments. They are autonomous, and they may have memory and learning 
abilities. They can interact with the other agents and environment that the experimenters 
build up in the model. We then calibrate an ABM with agents calibrated by parameters 
estimated from the EWA learning model to scale up findings from the laboratory 
experiment. We ensure that the agents are autonomous and heterogeneous and they can 
learn to adapt their strategies. In a nutshell, one agent in the ABM mimics one subject in 
the experiment. After building up the ABM, we first compare the simulation results with 
the experimental data to ensure the credibility of the ABM. We then increase the number 
of agents in the ABM and the number of interaction periods. We also test the sensitivity of 
the ambient tax policy when varying the number of players in one group. 
From the estimation results of the learning model, we find that players usually do 
not form beliefs in the game with an NPS pollution setting which means most players do 
not have beliefs about what other players will do. They, in general, use reinforcement 
learning to adapt their strategies. That is, they do not care about the hypothetical payoffs 
of unchosen strategies. The players’ abilities to map attractions into choice probabilities 
decreases as the environmental uncertainty level increases. Providing lagged information 
about other players’ behavior significantly increases the abilities to map attractions into 
choice probabilities in the low and high environmental uncertainty treatments. Based on 
the simulation results of the ABM, different behavior pattern may show up under certain 
circumstances when we scale up the number of NPS polluters and interaction times. We 
suggest that the agent-based modeling techniques can be used to double check the answers 
we have from the laboratory experiments. 
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In the next section, we present the details of the experiment. In Section 3.3 we 
report the results from the learning model, while in Section 3.4 we state the simulation 
results of the ABM. Section 3.5 provides a summary and a discussion of some extensions 
of this study. 
 
3.2 Experimental design, Parameterization, and Protocol 
The experiment we use to explore the players’ learning process in the NPS pollution 
settings under ambient-based policies in this manuscript is identical to the one we conduct 
in Miao et al. [2017]. However, because we are particularly interested the learning 
behavior, and there is potential spill-over effect in the second part of the sessions of the 
experiment, we only use the experimental data we collect from the first part of each session. 
Thus, different from Miao et al. [2017], this manuscript here utilizes a pure between-
subjects experimental design. 
3.2.1 Basic design 
The basic design of the experiment is from the setting of Segerson [1988]. We 
denote each farm in a small watershed by i, and there are I identical farms in total. Farm i 
can produce output yi (yi ≥ 0) and sell it at a fixed price p. Ci = C (yi, ai) represents the cost 
of Farm i, where ai (ai ≥ 0) is abatement effort, Cyi = ∂ Ci /∂ yi > 0 and Cai = ∂ Ci /∂ ai > 0. 
ri = r (yi, ai, ε) denotes the emission function of Farm i where ryi = ∂ ri /∂ yi > 0 and rai = ∂ 
ri /∂ ai < 0 and ε is a vector of stochastic variables such as whether. The function x = x (r1, 
r2,…, rI ) ≡ x (a, y, ε) represents the ambient pollution level of the common pool in the 
watershed. In the above function, a is a vector of abetment efforts of I farms and y is a 
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vector of production of I farms. The total environmental damages of a common pool in the 
watershed are a function of the ambient pollution level and equal D(x), where D (0) = 0, 
D’(x) > 0 and D’’(x) ≥ 0. 
 We impost the following ambient tax on each farm in the small watershed to make 
sure all the farms abate the pollution at the rate of socially optimal level: 
𝑇(𝑥) = {
𝑡𝑖 ∗ (𝑥 − ?̅?)        if 𝑥 > ?̅?
       0                   if 𝑥 ≤ ?̅?
                                                  (1) 
where ti is equal to  
𝑡𝑖 =  
E[𝐷′(𝑥)∗𝑥𝑦𝑖]−E[𝐷
′(𝑥)∗𝑥𝑎𝑖] 
E[𝑥𝑦𝑖]−E[𝑥𝑎𝑖]
                                                   (2). 
Readers can find more details about the experimental design in Miao et al. [2017]. 
3.2.2 Parameterization and experimental protocol 
As mentioned in the introduction, we utilize a 3×2 experimental design which 
generates six treatments in total (Table 3.1). We implement three uncertainty levels, which 
includes certainty, low uncertainty, and high uncertainty. The second treatment dimension 
contains no-information disclosure and information disclosure.  
The first treatment dimension is essentially different in the parameterization of the 
stochastic vector, ε, in the basic design. For simplification, we assume the vector is one 
dimension. In the certainty treatment, the stochastic term is equal to one. In the low 
uncertainty treatments, the stochastic term is a normalized (mean = 1) lognormal 
distribution with a small variation parameter. In the high uncertainty treatments, the mean 
the stochastic term is still equal to one, but with a relatively high variation parameter. The 
second treatment dimension is different in the ability to observe group members’ actions. 
When players are in no-information disclosure treatments, they receive information about 
  
 83 
the ambient pollution level and their payoffs. When players are in information disclosure 
treatments, they receive additional information about other players’ actions.  
In Table 3.2, we present the ambient pollution function, damage function, and the 
ambient tax function which are mostly drawn from previous literature. The threshold of 
ambient tax equals zero in our experiment which means we impose a tax on every unit of 
pollution. In the basic design, the participants of the experiment need to make two choices, 
the abatement level, and the production level. We use the idea from Suter et al. [2008] to 
simplify the participants’ choices as a management option. In Table 3.3, one management 
option maximizes the pre-tax profit subject to a specific (expected) emission levels.  
 Forty-two groups participated in twenty-one experimental sessions. Most of them 
were URI undergraduate students. Each group had six participants. We used z-Tree 
[Fischbacher, 2007] to run the experiment and document all decisions made by the 
participants. All sessions of experiments were run at the Policy Simulation Lab of the 
University of Rhode Island. A copy of the experimental instruction for the first treatment 
(see Appendix IV) was given to the participants before the experiment. They had ten 
minutes to read it. After everyone finished reading the instruction, the lead author gave an 
oral presentation and explained the underlying uncertainty in some treatments, several 
numerical examples, and how their management choices affected their profit, the ambient 
tax, and ambient pollution. Each session took about one hour and thirty minutes. The 
average payoff was $22.1 with a standard deviation of $3.8. 
Each treatment contains forty-five rounds. In each round, the participants chose one 
of six management options. Their decisions determined their private payoff which was 
shown in Table 3.3. Their emission levels were determined by their decisions and the 
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stochastic variables. The total emission equals the summation of six individual emissions 
in one group. The total emission and tax function in Table 3.2 form the ambient tax. More 
details about the Parameterization and the experimental protocol can be found in Miao et 
al. [2017]. 
 
3.3 The learning model and results of econometric analysis 
We use an econometric model of learning to investigate how players adapt their 
strategy in NPS pollution problem settings under ambient-based policies and how the 
adaption is different among different environmental uncertainty levels and different 
information sets. The experience weighted attraction (EWA) learning model develop by 
Camerer, and Ho [1999] are well suited for the analysis of learning process of players in 
repeated economic experiments. It combines reinforcement learning models and belief-
based models as a single learning model. This section describes the EWA model and 
presents the estimation results which offer insights about how learning differs in different 
treatments. 
3.3.1 The learning model 
Based on the design and parameterization in Section two, we use the following 
notation to describe the EWA model suited for our experimental data. Each player i has m 
pure strategies (m = 6 and Strategies are choices of management options in our 
experimental setting). Let 𝑠𝑖
𝑗
 denote that plaer i play the strategy j, one among m strategies. 
Since we expand the basic design of NPS polluter problem into repeated games, we use t 
to denote one period in the game. Let 𝑠𝑖(𝑡) be the strategy of player i in period t. At time t, 
we cluster the other players’ strategies, the environmental uncertainty level together and 
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denoted them as 𝑧(𝑡). If player i chooses strategy j in time t, her or his expected payoff of 
choosing strategy j in time t is denoted as 𝜋𝑖(𝑠𝑖
𝑗, 𝑧(𝑡)) and we assume player i in time t has 
a numerical attraction 𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡). Also, we assume the numerical attraction determines the 
probability of choosing strategy j in round t + 1 by the following logistic function: 
𝑃𝑖
𝑗(𝑡 + 1) =  𝑒
𝜆𝐴
𝑖
𝑗
(𝑡)
∑ 𝑒
𝜆𝐴𝑖
𝑘(𝑡)𝑚
𝑘=1
                                                         (3). 
 The new parameter 𝜆  in equation (3) is the player i’s sensitivity for mapping 
attractions into choice probabilities. Numerically speaking, if 𝜆  equals a number not 
statistically different from zero, we know that player i chooses his or her strategies 
randomly (in our setting, player i chooses each management options at the probability of 
about 1/6). If 𝜆 equals a significantly large number, we can see that player i chooses the 
most attractive strategies more often than others.  
 We assume the attraction of player i of choosing strategy j in period t is determined 
by the attraction in period t – 1, and the expected payoff of choosing strategy j in period t. 
The attraction for each strategy in each round of the experiment are updated based on the 
following equation: 
𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) =
𝛷𝑁(𝑡−1)𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡−1)+[𝛿+(1−𝛿)𝐼𝐹(𝑠𝑖
𝑗
,𝑠𝑖(𝑡))]𝜋𝑖(𝑠𝑖
𝑗
,𝑧(𝑡))
𝑁(𝑡)
                                      (4). 
In equation (4), 𝑁(𝑡) is a weight on the past attractions which follows the updating 
method: 𝑁(𝑡) =  𝛷 ∗ (1 −  𝜅) ∗ 𝑁(𝑡 − 1) + 1. The binary variable function I𝐹(𝑠𝑖
𝑗, 𝑠𝑖(𝑡)) 
is equal to zero if strategy j is not the strategy chosen by player i in round t. Otherwise, the 
indicator is equal to one. The parameter is 𝛷 a discount variable of previous attractions. If 
player i forgets or ignores previous experience deliberately because of various reasons, for 
example, uncertainty environment, the value of 𝛷 would be small. In the learning process, 
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the strength of forgone payoff of strategies that player i dose not choose in period t is 
weighted by the parameter 𝛿. A small 𝛿 would indicate that subjects tend to be reinforced 
by previous choices. Parameter 𝜅  is the discount rate of the experience weight 𝑁(𝑡) . 
Variables 𝑁(𝑡) and 𝐴𝑖
𝑗(𝑡) have initial value 𝑁(0) and 𝐴𝑖
𝑗(0).  
We follow previous literature [e.g., Feri et al., 2010] and use the maximum 
likelihood method to estimate the parameters for each treatment, and the following 
equation gives the likelihood function: 
𝐿(𝜆, 𝛷, 𝛿, 𝜅, 𝑁(0)) = ∏ [∏ 𝑃𝑖
𝑠𝑖(𝑡)(𝑡)45𝑡=1 ]
6
𝑖=1 .                                               (9) 
In equation (9), we impose the following necessary restrictions on the parameters 
λ, Φ, δ, κ, and 𝑁(0)：𝜆 ∊ (0,∞), 𝛷, 𝛿, 𝜅 ∊ (0,1] and 𝑁(0) ∊ (0,
1
1−(1−𝜅)∗𝛷
] to make sure 
the model is identifiable. All experience weights and attractions are updated over time 
when estimating the parameters of the model except the initial value of 𝐴𝑖
𝑗(0). We estimate 
the initial attractions of all strategies using the first period data based on the method 
proposed in Ho, Wang, and Camerer [2008]. For each treatment, we use the data of 42 
players (seven groups) decisions over 45 rounds to estimate the learning parameters. 
3.3.2 Estimation results of the EWA learning model 
We present the estimates for parameters λ, Φ, δ, κ, and 𝑁(0) in the EWA learning 
model in the Tables 3.4a and 3.4b. Table 3.4a reports the parameter estimates of the 
treatments in which the experiment participants only know their own payoffs and ambient 
pollution levels after each round of the experiment. Table 3.4b contains the estimation 
results of the treatments in which the players know additional information about the actions 
of all group members. 
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The first parameter λ in all treatments are all statistically significantly greater than 
zero, which implies that the participants of the experiment do not choose their strategies 
randomly in all treatments under the ambient tax policy. This result is not surprising since 
we can observe a non-uniform distribution of decisions in all treatments. When the 
participants cannot observe group members’ strategies, the ability of mapping attractions 
into choice probabilities decreases as the uncertainty levels increases (Table 3.4a, row 1). 
The estimate of λ for the treatment without individual-level environmental uncertainty 
(Treatment A) equals 1.72, which is statistically significantly higher than the value of λ 
(1.01) in the low uncertainty treatment (Treatment B). Hence, if the participants in the two 
treatments face the same attractions, the participants experiencing the low individual-level 
environmental uncertainty are less likely to choose the strategy with the highest attractions 
than the participants in the certainty treatment. By the same token, the participants in the 
treatment with high individual-level environmental uncertainty are less sensitive to map 
attractions into choice probabilities than the participants experiencing low individual-level 
environmental uncertainty. In general, the increasing uncertainty level induces more 
randomness of choosing strategies under the ambient tax policy. 
When the participants can observe group members’ actions, the ability to map 
attractions into probabilities substantially increases in the uncertainty treatments. By 
comparing the first rows of Table 3.4a and Table 3.4b, we can see that additional 
information about group members’ actions does not affect the values of λ in the certainty 
treatments (Treatments A and D). However, the values of λ in uncertainty treatments with 
information disclosure (Treatments E and F) are statistically significantly greater than 
corresponding values of λ in uncertainty treatments without information disclosure 
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(Treatments B and C). The trend that increasing uncertainty induces randomness of choices 
still holds. In general, we can conclude that under the ambient tax policies knowing group 
members’ actions help the participants to allocate more probabilities to the strategies with 
the same attractions. 
The value of Φ are all statistically significantly greater than zero, and the values are 
all relatively close to one, ranging from 0.88 to 0.98, reflecting that the decay rate of 
previous attractions are low and the previous play has a strong influence on the attractions. 
The values of Φ are notably significantly larger in uncertainty treatments than in certainty 
treatments. It implies that under the ambient tax policy, previous experience is significant 
to the participants in an uncertain environment and they discard old experience more 
quickly in without any uncertainty. However, we find that the additional information about 
the group members’ actions does not affect the decay rate of previous attractions (second 
rows of Table 3.4a and 3.4b). 
We observe δ which are not statistically different from zero in all the uncertainty 
treatments. It indicates that the participants neglect the possible payoffs from unchosen 
strategies under the individual-level environmental uncertainty. Their learning type is close 
to reinforcement learning type, which means they are mainly reinforced by the payoffs they 
received during the experiments. In both certainty treatments, the values of δ are 
statistically significantly different from zero. It demonstrates that the participants who do 
not experience the environmental uncertainty at the individual level under the ambient tax 
policy take into account the hypothetical payoffs from unchosen strategies and put a 
positive weight on those strategies. In other words, they practice belief-based learning. We 
do not observe a significant impact of information disclosure on the weight of unchosen 
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strategies since the differences of the values of δ are not statistically significant (the third 
row of Tables 3.4a and3.4b). 
The estimates for 𝑁(0) are the initial values of the weights on past attractions in 
the six treatments (last row, Tables 3.4a and 3.4b). It reflects the pregame experience of 
the participants of each treatment. Based on record of our post-experiment conversation 
parts, none the participants did not experience such types of experiment before. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the values of 𝑁(0) are very different from each other in those 
treatments given that we have between-subjects experimental design. Also, it makes senses 
that the levels of environmental uncertainty and the different sets of information disclosed 
to the participants have no systematic impact on the weights of past attractions. 
Estimates of 𝜅(t), the discount rates of 𝑁(𝑡), however, are systematically different 
across treatments. When the participants cannot observe group members’ actions, the 
discount rates increase as the levels of environmental uncertainty increases. It implies that 
the participants significantly update their weights on the past attractions under uncertain 
environment as the experiment continues. We can see from the fourth row of Table 3.4a 
that the values of κ are statistically significantly different from zero in the uncertainty 
treatments. The magnitude of updating increases when they experience an environment 
with more variation.  The trend also holds where the participants can observe group 
members’ actions (fourth row, Table 3.4b). The ability to know group members’ actions 
generally induces decreases in the discount rates (fourth row of Table 3.4a and 3.4b). 
To sum up, the estimates of the EWA learning model suggest that NPS polluters 
update their experience about their strategies over time and they may only be reinforced 
previous plays and payoffs, especially in an uncertainty environment. This finding is likely 
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to explain in part why behavior does not converge to a certain level as predicted after many 
rounds of interactions under the ambient tax policy. Environmental uncertainty degrades 
the NPS polluters’ ability to map the attractions into probabilities, which may induce more 
randomness of strategy choices. This effect becomes larger as the uncertainty level 
increases, and it potentially induces more variation of strategy choices. Also, we found 
instances where the environmental uncertainty makes the NPS polluters neglect the payoffs 
of the unchosen strategies. Therefore, it could be one reason that the ambient tax policy 
does not induce perfectly desirable behavior all the time. The information set is also 
important to the learning process in the experiment. Knowing group members’ actions may 
enhance NPS polluters’ abilities to map the attractions into the choice probabilities in an 
uncertain environment. In the next section, we integrate the estimation results of the EWA 
learning into an ABM to scale up the findings we have from the experiment. 
 
3.4 ABM framework, calibration, and simulation results  
In this section, we describe the framework and calibration of the ABM which is 
used to scale up the NPS polluters’ behavior. Its simulation results are presented after the 
description of the ABM. We use the Python language to build up the ABM.  
3.4.1 The ABM framework and calibration 
The ABM uses the same environment as in the laboratory experiment so that we 
can have direct comparisons between the real experiment participants and simulated 
agents. We create 1200 agents and divide into 200 groups. Each group with six agents is 
located in an isolated watershed, and their production activities increase their profit but 
degrade their local water quality. Identical to the laboratory experiment, the level of 
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degradation depends on their management options and their environment which is changed 
by the uncertainty treatment types. The information sets provided to the agent also vary 
across treatments. The agents in a group interact with group members for 450 rounds 
through the ambient tax policy. That is, one agent’s choice of management options affect 
its own and group members’ profit through the ambient tax policy. 
We use the estimation results of the EWA learning model to specify agents’ 
behavior. This specification ensures that the agents adapt their strategies over time, as well 
as autonomy and heterogeneity of the simulated agents. We assume the agents maximize 
their expected profits, weigh forgone payoffs, update old experience, be reinforced by 
previous actions and learn to adapt their strategies based on different environment and 
information sets. After processing all the information, agents update their attractions of 
each management options at the end of each period. They make their final choices based 
on a logistic function same as the choice function in the EWA learning model. In a nutshell, 
the management options with the highest attractions in period t have the most top 
probabilities to be chosen by the agents in period t +1. Worth to mention, the static Nash 
equilibrium of each period in the ABM is unique and identical to the dominant Nash 
strategies in the experiment. 
Fehr and Fischbacher [2003] point out the initial plays matter in public goods 
games. To test the sensitivity of initial choices in our setting, we initiate the ABM with 
three methods. One is to randomly choose arrays of management options, which means 
each agent choose each management options with equal probability of 1/6.  The second 
way is to use the pre-experiment attraction data that we estimate for the EWA learning 
model estimation to calculate six arrays of prospects respecting to six treatments. The 
  
 92 
agents choose the management options independently based on the calculated probability 
arrays. The third method is to use specific management option combinations. For example, 
we try to start from the collusive equilibrium or status quo strategies. We also increase the 
number of group members in each group to echo the group size effect in the public goods 
literature [e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1988]. 
3.4.2 Simulation results of the ABM  
We show part of the simulation results of the ABM in the Figure 3.3a and 3.3b. 
This cluster of simulation uses the second method we describe in Part 4.1 to decide the 
initial condition of the simulation. The Figure 3.3a exhibits the dynamic behavior of 1200 
agents over 450 rounds of the treatments in which the experiment participants only know 
their payoffs and ambient pollution levels. Figure 3b displays the evolution of all the 
agents’ behavior when they can get additional information about the actions of all group 
members. 
From the simulation results, we can see that the agents’ strategies do not converge 
to a point even though there are many rounds of interactions and plenty of interacted agents, 
no matter what the combinations of learning parameters are. It seems that choices of the 
agents who are not exposed to the environmental uncertainty have less variation than 
choices under uncertainty. Also, when the agents know group members’ actions, it appears 
that the additional information decreases choice variation under the environmental 
uncertainty. Those general findings agree with the outcomes that we find from the 
experiment.  
We also find that the simulation results can approximately match the participant’s 
behavior in the experiment under the ambient tax policy in the uncertainty treatments when 
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there is no additional information disclosed to the participants. The average individual 
emission levels of the experiment participants are all slightly above the social optimum. 
Miao et al. (2017) show that the environmental uncertainty at the individual level induces 
under-abatement. The simulation results seem to support the results at the large scale and 
in the extended period. Also, we find the environmental uncertainty increases the variety 
of decisions in the ABM (Figure 3.3a). This finding also coincides with the outcome of the 
experiment. However, we cannot observe over-abatement behavior in the ABM when the 
agents do know their group members’ actions, and they do not face any environmental 
uncertainty. We conjecture that in the collusive experiment equilibrium may play a role in 
the choices of management options and the participants find ways to cooperate with each 
other to some degree. The first assumption of the EWA learning model is that the 
participants play a non-cooperative game. Therefore, the agents in the ABM may lack the 
ability to find a way to cooperate with each other. It could be one potential caveat of using 
the EWA learning model to specify the agent behavior in an ABM. 
When the information about group members’ action is provided to the agents in the 
ABM and the participants in experiments, their behavior is similar in the uncertainty 
treatments in the first few periods (Figure 3.2b and 3.3b). However, after a few rounds of 
interactions, the agents in the ABM form a trend to decrease their emission levels under 
the high level of environmental uncertainty. The choices after many rounds of interactions 
oscillate around the socially optimal level. With a more in-depth inspection of this 
behavior, we find that the large shocks, in the form of significant negative payoffs, 
decreases the attractions of choices with emission levels exceeding the socially optimal 
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emission. We cannot observe this trend from the experiment data, which can be caused by 
the lack of enough interactions.  
These results suggest that after many rounds of learning, for example, several 
hurricanes in a short period, people understand the importance of adaptation and begin the 
adaptation process and react to others’ adaptation behavior. However, in the experiment, 
because of the limited time in the laboratory, the shocks in the high environmental 
uncertainty treatments may not build up enough negative attractions. In the post-
experiment nonbinding conversation with the experiment participants after the experiment 
sessions, most people thought that the shocks would come back after many rounds given 
one shock happened, and they usually increased their emission levels after encountering 
any shocks. The experimental data indeed reveal this type of behavior. When the agents 
can observe group members’ behavior, and they experience no environmental uncertainty, 
their behavior is close to the participants’ behavior in the experiment. 
We change the way we define the initial conditions of the ABM to check the 
sensitivities of initial choices. We find that the dynamic behavior of the agents is not 
sensitive to the initial decisions under the ambient tax policy. Their choice quickly 
converges to the range of options in the first cluster of ABM as reported above. The 
simulation results are not sensitive to the group size, either. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
We run a laboratory experiment to infer how the NPS polluters adapt their strategies 
under the ambient tax policy and how the environmental uncertainty at the individual level 
and information disclosure affect their learning patterns. We find that NPS polluters may 
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be mainly reinforced by previous plays under the ambient tax policy, especially they 
experience environmental uncertainty. This results could partially explain why equilibria 
cannot be reached in most economic experiments studying ambient-based policies. The 
increased level of environmental uncertainty decreases NPS polluters’ ability to choose 
options with high attractions. Also, the ability to know group members’ actions may help 
NPS polluters to make better decisions.  
The simulation results of the ABM reveal that the agents calibrated by the EWA 
learning models can mimic subjects’ behavior in the experiment. Also, the results show 
that the NPS polluters’ behavior may not converge to socially desired behavior even in the 
long run under the ambient-based policy. Also, the results tell us that the shocks under high 
environmental uncertainty could only be effective in the long term given they can observe 
other group members’ actions. Initial choices and group size seemingly do not affect the 
effectiveness of the ambient tax policy.  
In the future work, we may change the environment of the ABM where the agents 
interact with other group members. More realistic production functions, abetment 
functions, damage functions and spatial information can be introduced into the 
environment while we keep the learning parameters of the agents unchanged. After running 
the ABM, the more realistic setting can offer more external validities to test the ambient 
tax policy when field studies are still hard to accomplish. 
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Table 3.1: Treatment tables 
Treatment 
 
Label Information about others group members' decisions Uncertainty Level 
A 
No information, 
Certainty No Certainty 
B 
No information, Low 
uncertainty No Low uncertainty 
C 
No information, High 
certainty No High uncertainty 
D 
Information, Certainty 
Yes Certainty 
E 
Information, Low 
uncertainty Yes Low uncertainty 
F 
Information, High 
certainty Yes High uncertainty 
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0
1
 
Table 3.2: Function forms and parameterization 
Description Function Form 
Parameter Values 
Certainty 
Parameter Values  
Low uncertainty 
Parameter Values 
High uncertainty 
Profit function  
π (yi, ai) 
p*yi - (Ayi
2 + B ai
2) + C 
 p = 6.00, A =0.02, B = 
0.05, C = 350 
 p = 6, A =0.02, B = 
0.05, C = 350 
p = 6, A =0.02, B = 0.05, 
C = 350  
Emission Function 
ri(yi, ai, ε) 
(Eyi
2 - Fai
0.5)* ε /(μ + σ2/2)  
E = 1/3750, F = 4/75, ε 
=μ + σ2/2 
E = 1/2750, F = 2/275, , ε 
~ log N(1.25,0.5) 
E = 1/2750, F = 2/275, ε 
~ log N(0.875,1) 
Ambient pollution 
function x(r) 

I
1i
ir   I = 6 I = 6 I = 6 
Damage function 
D(x) 
H * x  H = 30  H = 30   H = 30  
Tax function 
T(x) 
t * x t = 30 t = 30 t = 30 
  
 
1
0
2
 
Table 3.3: Profit-maximizing values of production and abatement  
Management Option (Expected) Emissions (r) Abatement (a) Production (y) Profit (π) 
#6 6.00 0.00 150.00 800.00 
#5 5.00 1.46 137.81 796.92 
#4 4.00 2.62 123.78 785.92 
#3 3.00 3.93 107.91 763.81 
#2 2.00 5.69 89.32 724.73 
#1 1.00 8.67 65.87 654.68 
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Table 3.4a: Parameter estimates of the EWA learning model for no-information 
disclosure treatments 
    
Parameters Treatment A  Treatment B  Treatment C  
λ 1.72** 1.01*** 0.22*** 
 (0.87) (0.16) (0.08) 
Φ 0.88*** 0.95*** 0.93*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
δ 0.13** 0.12 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.13) 
κ 0.01 0.06*** 0.38** 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.16) 
N(0) 4.40 1.06** 0.30** 
  (3.15) (0.48) (0.14) 
N = 1890 for each treatment. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
 
Table 3.4b: Parameter estimates of the EWA learning model for information 
disclosure treatments 
Parameters Treatment D  Treatment E  Treatment F 
λ 1.45*** 1.73*** 0.46*** 
 (0.26) (0.07) (0.08) 
Φ 0.90*** 0.93*** 0.98*** 
 0.11 (0.01) (0.01) 
δ 0.18** 0.00 0.12 
 (0.07) (0.00) (0.10) 
κ 0.03 0.00 0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.00) 0.02 
N(0) 3.06*** 4.07*** 0.66*** 
  (1.01) 0.71 (0.24) 
N = 1890 for each treatment. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
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Figure 3.1a: Average social efficiency over time (No information disclosure) 
 
Figure 3.1b: Average social efficiency over time (With information disclosure) 
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Figure 3.2a: Average individual emission over time (no information disclosure) 
 
 
Figure 3.2b: Average individual emission over time (with information disclosure) 
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Figure 3.3a: Simulated average individual emission over time (no information 
disclosure) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3b: Simulated average individual emission over time (with information 
disclosure 
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POLICY IMPLICATION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
It has been well established that economic inefficiency in the nonpoint source 
(NPS) pollution problems stems from information asymmetries [Farzin and Kaplan, 
2004]. The size of emissions cannot be inferred or observed with reasonable cost 
because NPS pollution comes from diffuse sources and is in the form of excess 
fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides. For example, it is typically prohibitively costly 
to get information about how much pollution comes from one specific parcel of land in 
the field, such as a residential lawn or a plot of agricultural land. Information 
asymmetries between the environmental regulator and those whose activities generate 
pollution emissions make traditional emission tax or regulation ineffective [Xepapadeas, 
2011]. Alternative policies designed by economists to control NPS pollution are 
generally divided into two categories: regulatory approaches [e.g., ambient-based 
instruments (Segerson, 1988; Xepapadeas, 1992; Xepapadeas, 1995; Horan et al., 1998; 
Hansen, 2002) and input taxes (Griffin and Bromley, 1982; Shortle and Dunn, 1986)] 
and voluntary approaches [e.g., voluntary-threat approach (Segerson and Wu, 2006; Li, 
2013),  and “pay-the-polluter” approach (Hanley et al., 1998)]. 
In this dissertation, I examine how information affects NPS polluters’ behavior 
in a voluntary program and under a regulatory policy. In particular, I investigate the 
effects of informational nudges and financial incentives on homeowners’ decisions of 
choosing lawn care services through a field experiment. Additionally, I test the effects 
of environmental uncertainty at the individual level and information disclosure on 
polluters’ behavior under an ambient tax policy in a laboratory experiment and one 
agent-based model. 
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In the voluntary program, I find that informational nudges and financial 
incentives may effectively change homeowners’ behavior. However, I find that the two 
types of intervention are not complementary in promoting environment-friendly 
behavior. In the laboratory experiment where I use students to represent NPS polluters 
to test the effectiveness and efficiency of the ambient tax policy, I find that 
environmental uncertainty at the individual level increases the NPS pollution level and 
thus jeopardize the efficiency of the ambient tax policy. Also, I discover that 
information disclosure, giving the laboratory subjects the ability to observe other group 
members’ actions, lower the NPS pollution level. However, information disclosure 
induces over-abetment behavior, especially when there is an environment with certainty, 
and therefore lowers the efficiency of the ambient tax policy. When I use agents in the 
ABM to represent NPS polluters to investigate their behavior in the long run, I discover 
similar treatment effects of environmental uncertainty. High level of environmental 
uncertainty, however, creates plenty of negative payoff shocks and induces pollution 
reduction in the long run when agents can observe group members’ behavior. 
Results from this dissertation research suggest that information is vital in 
managing NPS pollution, whether in a voluntary program or under a regulatory policy, 
but that an environmental regulator should use information carefully and strategically 
in designing policy to reduce NPS pollution. Current solutions to NPS pollution problem 
rely heavily on voluntary adoption of best management practices. Financial incentives 
or technical assistance are often used in the farming sector. Information to nudge 
environmental friendly behavior to reduce NPS pollution is commonly used in outreach 
programs. Our results imply a potential tension between informational nudges and 
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financial incentives in the context of the lawn care practices. Subsidizing or nudging 
homeowners may both work to change their behavior so that desired outcomes can be 
achieved, but both of them can be costly. Using both solutions together do not increase 
behavior changes significantly in the extensive margin compared to using one of the 
solutions alone. Thus, our results further imply that the regulator needs to design 
voluntary programs cautiously to reduce NPS pollution, especially when information 
nudges and financial incentives are used together. Cost-benefit analysis should be 
conducted to estimate strengths and weakness of both solutions before any 
implementation. Also, targeting the right population may help improve the efficiency 
of policy since results from the voluntary program suggest different strategies work for 
different people depending on their degree of environmental preferences. Specifically, 
financial incentives may better change the behavior of people who have already 
possessed the information of nudges. Conversely, informational nudges may have a 
significant effect on those people who may develop less environmental awareness.  
  Recently, budgets used for voluntary programs to reduce NPS pollution has 
been limited in the United States. Congress has continuously cut the budget 
tremendously for U.S. Department of Agriculture conservation programs, which are the 
primary source of funding to support voluntary adoption of best management practices 
[Shortle et al., 2012]. This increasingly budget-constrained situation underscores the 
demand for alternative policy approaches if water quality goals are to be achieved.  
Although according to the literature, there are no applications of ambient-based policy 
in the field, it is one of the promising policy based on a series of theoretical research 
and a dozen of empirical analyses in the laboratory. I envision that ambient-based policy 
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instruments are the critical solutions to the nonpoint source pollutions because of two 
advantages. First, they target ambient pollution level and do not require firm-specific 
information and thus reduce the complication of policy design compared to other 
proposed policy instruments, such as input-based incentives. Second, they are optimal 
solutions to both point and nonpoint source pollution so that we do not have to devise 
two separate incentive systems to reduce pollution if both types of pollution exist in a 
watershed.    
Despite the advantages of ambient-based policy instruments, their efficiency and 
impact on pollution abatement are sensitive to how those instruments are designed.  
Based on the results of previous literature and this dissertation, we understand that one 
subset of ambient-based policy instruments are more effective and efficient than others 
and several restrictions may help an environmental regulator to improve overall social 
efficiency. Specifically, the ambient tax seems to be the most suitable one among all the 
ambient-based policy instruments because of its ability to eliminate the possible 
inefficient collusive behavior.  
Various theoretical and experimental studies to date have allowed to us 
understand multiple theoretical properties of the ambient tax policy. However, it has yet 
to be implemented in the field. As the first step, I recommend that the field experiments 
start with a relatively small watershed with relatively few, homogeneous polluters. 
Involving too many polluters worsens the balance budgeting between damages and tax 
payments since the ambient tax is a collective penalty. Also, heterogeneity among 
polluters decreases social efficiency based previous experimental studies. Moreover, the 
target which triggers the ambient tax needs to be set with care. Although the theoretical 
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literature demonstrates that the target can be arbitrary and some experimental research 
also suggests that social efficiency does not have significant change when we vary the 
target, my experimental results provide evidence that a target below the optimum 
reduces social efficiency most due to over-abatement behavior. Therefore, I conclude 
that the environmental regulator can choose neither a too low target nor a too high one. 
If it is too low, it may induce over-abatement behavior because of various reasons, such 
as communication. If it is too high, the environmental regulator cannot achieve desired 
environmental outcomes. It is critical to obtain the reliable water quality data to 
approximate the social optimum and may need to be flexible so that the target can be 
adjusted based on long-term trends in water quality patterns, specific cases, and policy 
outcomes. Also, previous literature suggests that it is crucial to reduce error and increase 
measurement accuracy when monitoring ambient pollution level because uncertainty in 
ambient pollution measurement lowers social efficiency. Furthermore, my experimental 
results indicate that environmental uncertainty may induce nonpoint source polluters’ 
under-abatement behavior, and therefore, this vital feature of NPS pollution also 
requires the flexible design of the target.  
Future research on ambient-based policy instruments may focus on searching 
for close analogs to such instruments. Ideally, different policy designs need to be tested 
using field experiments. If close analogs cannot be found in the field, demonstration 
projects that further show their effectiveness and efficiency may be helpful for decision 
making. While all these future research directions are temporarily infeasible, we may 
step back, look into the existing data and find better models to describe subjects’ 
behavior under the ambient-based policy. We can further test the policy using the ABM 
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techniques, which may break through the limitations of laboratory experiments and 
expand the possibility of research such as integrating behavior in the laboratory with 
real-world environmental data to produce case-specific results. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Field experiment survey 
North East Water Resources Network Field Experiment Survey  
[Italic part in this appendix was not shown in the online survey.] 
 
Q1      
 Welcome to the University of Rhode Island’s survey on lawn care and sustainable 
practices.      
Thank you for your participation in this important survey. Your response will help us 
understand how homeowners make decisions about lawn care practices. Before we 
begin, please answer a few eligibility questions.      
Please click ‘Next page>>’ to begin.  
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Screening questions: (Q2 – Q7) 
Q2  
Which state do you live in? (Please choose one) 
 Rhode Island (1) 
 Massachusetts (2) 
 Connecticut (3) 
 Other (4) 
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Display This Question: 
If Which state do you live in? Massachusetts Is Selected 
Q3  
What is your zip code? (Please choose one) 
A list of zip codes was displayed. 
Display This Question: 
If Which state do you live in? Connecticut Is Selected 
Q4  
What is your zip code? (Please choose one) 
A list of zip codes was displayed. 
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Display This Question: 
If Which state do you live in? Other Is Not Selected 
And What is your zip code?  - Other Is Not Selected 
And What is your zip code?  - Other Is Not Selected 
Q5  
Does your current residence have a lawn?  
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
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Display This Question: 
If Which state do you live in? Other Is Not Selected 
And What is your zip code?  - Other Is Not Selected 
And Does your current residence have a lawn?  No Is Not Selected 
And What is your zip code?  - Other Is Not Selected 
Q6  
Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) 
 Myself/Other member(s) of my household (1) 
 Lawn care company (2) 
 Landlord/Complex management (3) 
 Friend/Neighbor (4) 
 Someone else but not a professional (5) 
 Other (Please specify) (6) ____________________ 
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Display This Question: 
If Who maintains your lawn? Lawn care company Is Selected 
Q7  
Which lawn care company did you hire in 2016? (Please choose one) 
 A Cut Above (1) 
 A. Paliotta (2) 
 Countyview Landscaping (3) 
 Cryan Landscaping (4) 
 Dana Designs (5) 
 Dapontes Landscaping (6) 
 It’s About Thyme Landscaping (7) 
 McGeoghs Turf Mgt (8) 
 Murdock Landscaping (9) 
 SeaScape LawnCare (10) 
 None the above (11) 
  
  
120 
 
Introduction and Survey Part I (Q8 - Q17) 
Q8      
Dear Homeowner,           
Welcome to the University of Rhode Island’s survey on residential lawn care. This 
survey is part of a study on decisions related to water quality funded by the National 
Science Foundation. The results of this survey will help us understand how homeowners 
make decisions about lawn care practices in southern New England.       
This survey will take about 15 minutes to complete. As a small thank you gift, all 
participants who are eligible for the study will receive a $2 Amazon e-gift card. The gift 
card will be emailed to you. You can then use it yourself or donate to a 
school/organization of your choice.         
Please be assured that the information you provide is completely confidential. It will not 
be disclosed to anyone without your permission. Study findings will only be presented 
in summaries where individual answers cannot be identified.          
Your participation is very important to us if we are to gain a fair and accurate 
understanding of households’ decisions and opinions. However, you can choose not to 
answer any questions or withdraw from the study at any time.          
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Dr. Emi Uchida (Associate 
Professor, Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of Rhode 
Island). You may reach her by email (euchida@uri.edu) or by phone (401-874-4586). 
In addition, you may contact the office of the Vice President for Research and Economic 
Development, 70 Lower College Rd., Suite 2, Kingston, RI (401-874-4328). This 
survey has been reviewed according to University of Rhode Island Institutional Review 
Board procedures for research involving human subjects.           
By clicking the following “Next page>>” button, you agree that:        
 • You have read the above information;   
 • You understand that your participation is voluntary;   
• You are at least 18 years of age. 
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Q9  
Part I: Your lawn care practices in the year 2016       
In this section, we will ask a few questions about your lawn care practices in the year 
2016.  
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Display This Question: 
If Who maintains your lawn? Lawn care company Is Selected 
Q10 You informed us that you hired a lawn care company to maintain your lawn in 
2016. Please tell us which of the following services were provided by the lawn care 
company. (Choose all that apply) 
 Watering (1) 
 Fertilizing (2) 
 Mowing (3) 
 Aeration (4) 
 Seeding (5) 
 Insect control (6) 
 Disease control (7) 
 Weed control (8) 
 Crabgrass control (9) 
 Other (Please specify) (10) ____________________ 
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Display This Question: 
If Who maintains your lawn? Lawn care company Is Selected 
Q11 
Which of the following actions were used by the lawn care company you hired in 2016? 
 Yes (1) No (2) I don't know (3) 
Conducted a soil test        
Used conventional 
fertilizers  
      
Used slow release 
nitrogen fertilizer  
      
Used organic 
fertilizers  
      
Left your grass 
clippings on the 
lawn  
      
Mowed your lawn 
between 3 to 4 
inches  
      
Hand-watered spots 
during very dry 
periods  
      
Cleaned driveway 
and sidewalks after 
applying fertilizer  
      
Did not treat under 
windy or rainy 
conditions  
      
Spot treated weeds 
with herbicide  
      
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Display This Question: 
If Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Myself/Other member(s) of my 
household Is Selected 
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Friend/Neighbor Is Selected 
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Someone else but not a 
professional Is Selected 
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Other (Please specify) Is 
Selected 
Q12  
Which of the following actions did your household or the person managing your lawn 
take to maintain your lawn in 2016? (Choose all that apply) 
 Watering (1) 
 Fertilizing (2) 
 Mowing (3) 
 Aerating (4) 
 Seeding (5) 
 Insect control (6) 
 Disease Control (7) 
 Weed control (8) 
 Crabgrass control (9) 
 Other (Please specify) (10) ____________________ 
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Display This Question: 
If Who maintains your lawn? Myself/Other member(s) of my household Is 
Selected… 
Q13  
Which of the following practices did your household or the person managing your 
lawn follow to maintain your lawn in 2016?  
 Yes (1) No (2) I don't know (3) 
Conducted a soil test        
Used conventional 
fertilizers  
      
Used slow release 
nitrogen fertilizer  
      
Used organic 
fertilizers  
      
Left your grass 
clippings on the 
lawn  
      
Mowed your lawn 
between 3 to 4 
inches  
      
Hand-watered spots 
during very dry 
periods 
      
Cleaned driveway 
and sidewalks after 
applying fertilizer  
      
Did not treat under 
windy or rainy 
conditions 
      
Spot treated weeds 
with herbicide 
      
 
Display This Question: 
If Who maintains your lawn? Lawn care company Is Selected 
Q14  
How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016? (In US 
dollars)  (Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) 
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Display This Question: 
If Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Myself/Other member(s) of my 
household Is Selected 
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Friend/Neighbor Is Selected 
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Someone else but not a 
professional Is Selected 
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Other (Please specify) Is 
Selected 
Q15 How much did your household or the person managing your lawn spend in TOTAL 
in 2016 for your lawn care? (In US Dollars).     Please include expenses for fertilizers, 
pesticides, seeds and other materials you can think of. (Do not include 
machinery.)  (Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) 
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Display This Question: 
If Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Myself/Other member(s) of my 
household Is Selected 
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Someone else but not a 
professional Is Selected 
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Friend/Neighbor Is Selected 
Or Who maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Other (Please specify) Is 
Selected 
Q16 How many hours per month on average did your household or the person managing 
your lawn spend on maintaining your lawn last season?  (Please enter a NUMBER in 
the box.) 
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Q17  
What is the size of your lawn in ACRES? Please provide your best estimate. (Please 
enter a NUMBER in the box. For example, if your lawn is half an acre, please enter 
0.5.)     
 For your reference:         
 One football field (including the two end zones) = 1.3 acres  
 An official basketball court = 0.1 acre. 
 Average floor area in new single-family houses in the northeast U.S. in 
2010 = 0.06 acre. 
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Survey Part II: treatments (Information treatments + Financial Incentives) 
 
Q18  
Part II: About Green Certified Lawn Care Companies           
 
With proper care, it is possible to have a sustainable, responsible and healthy lawn.      
 
In this section, you will find important information about services provided by ‘green-
certified’ lawn care companies. Please read the information carefully. We will ask a 
few questions following the information.   
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One of the following three treatments will be randomly displayed at the same 
probability for each survey. 
Information Treatment 1 (Q19 – Q28) 
Q19  
Since 2015, Rhode Island (RI) has a “Green Certification” program for lawn care 
companies. As of January 2017, 10 lawn care companies are green-certified by the RI 
Department of Environmental Management.       
                                                                                                              
To be certified, lawn care companies must fulfill selected best management practices to 
protect water quality, conserve water, and contribute to the sustainability of the 
landscape.           
Here are some practices the green-certified companies have adopted:    
 mow appropriately (maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches),    
 fertilize appropriately (e.g., fertilize based on a soil test, use non-phosphorous, 
slow-release fertilizer),    
 use safer pesticides (e.g., use mostly granular pesticides to reduce product drift 
and customer exposure) etc. when maintaining lawns.           
Green-certified lawn care companies need to adopt additional best management 
practices to get re-certified every two years.         
The NEXT graphic summarizes these practices.        
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Q20  
Here is a summary of what GREEN-CERTIFIED lawn care companies do. 
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Q21  
If you would like to know more about the lawn care practices commonly adopted by 
green-certified lawn care, here are a few reputable sources*:   
University of Rhode Island's Stormwater Solutions:  
web.uri.edu/riss/take-action/simple-steps-at-home/around-the-yard/#FertilizeSparingly  
University of Connecticut's Sustainable Landscaping:   
http://www.sustainability.uconn.edu/sustain/turf/intro.html  
University of Massachusetts' Turf Program: 
https://ag.umass.edu/turf/publications-resources/best-management-practices          
If you decide to check these websites out now, please click the above links and come 
back to the survey within a few minutes to complete.        
*Please note that the best management practices on the websites above are examples of 
suggested practices. Each certified company chooses a set of practices to get green-
certified and may not all adopt the same practice.         
Did you check one or more of those websites? 
 Yes, I did. (1) 
 No, I did not. (2) 
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Q22  
 
In your opinion, which of the following lawn care practices do you think is effective in 
sustaining water quality? (Choose all that apply)    
 Conduct a soil test (1) 
 Maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches (2) 
 Fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer (3) 
 Clean up fertilizer from driveways, walkways, and roads after application (4) 
 Use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed (5) 
 Leave areas untreated around water bodies and wetlands (6) 
 None the above (7) 
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Q23  
Were you aware that Rhode Island has a Green Certification program for lawn care 
companies? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Selected 
And How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016? 
(In US dollars)&nbsp;&nbsp;(Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) $ Is Not Empty 
Q24  
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for their services for the entire season?      
You stated that you paid $ x for your services in 2016. Please use your payment for lawn 
care in 2016 as a reference.      
Imagine that the green-certified lawn care companies will offer you the same services 
as the company you hired in 2016, but use best management practices that 
minimize the impact on water quality. Examples include:      
• maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches   
• water efficiently   
• fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer   
• use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed.  
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Not Selected 
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex 
management Is Not Selected 
And How much did your household or the person managing your law spend in 
TOTAL in 2016 for your lawn care? (In US Dollars) Is Not Empty 
And How many hours per month on average did your household or the person 
managing your … Is Not Empty 
Q25  
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season? 
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly 
services:      
• Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate, to avoid 
over fertilizing 
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients   
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control   
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)   
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.               
For your information, you stated that your household spent $x annually and x hour(s) 
each month on average to take care of your lawn in 2016. Please use these figures as a 
reference. 
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Selected 
And How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016? 
(In US dollars)&nbsp;&nbsp;(Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) $ Is Empty 
Q26  
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for their services for the entire season?      
Imagine that the green-certified lawn care companies will offer you the same services 
as the company you hired in 2016, but use best management practices that 
minimize the impact on water quality. Examples include:      
• maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches   
•water efficiently   
• fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer   
• use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed.  
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Not Selected 
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex 
management Is Not Selected 
And How much did your household or the person managing your lawn spend in 
TOTAL in 2016 for your lawn care…  $ Is Empty 
Q27  
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season? 
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly 
services:     • Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate 
to avoid over fertilizing   
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients  
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control   
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)   
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.        
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Not Selected 
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex 
management Is Not Selected 
And There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If 
you were to hire...Is Not Displayed 
And How many hours per month o… Is Empty 
Q28  
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season? 
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly 
services: 
• Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate, to avoid 
over fertilizing 
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients 
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control 
• Pelletized limestone (early fall) 
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.     
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Information Treatment 2 (Q29 – Q42) 
 
Q29 
 Part II---Section 1: Your lawn care and water quality     
 
 Here you will find information about how your lawn care can affect local water 
quality depending on how you manage it.  Please read the information carefully. We 
will ask you one question following the information. 
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Q30  
Data Sources:  
https://cfpub.epa.gov/npstbx/files/Norming_Survey_LawnCare_NewEngland_July201
0.pdf 
 http://www.stormwatercenter.net/Practice/131-Homeowner%20Survey.pdf 
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Q31  
In your opinion, which message from the previous figure was the most surprising to 
you? (Choose one) 
 Improper fertilizer can be harmful to our drinking water, fish and other aquatic life. 
(1) 
 Proper lawn care can make a difference in protecting our drinking water, fish and 
other aquatic life. (2) 
 74% of households fertilize their lawns. (3) 
 Only 2% of households conduct a soil test before fertilizing their lawns. (4) 
 40% of the households use the whole bag of fertilizer to avoid storage. (5) 
 None of the above were surprising to me. (6) 
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Q32  
Part II---Section 2: About Green Certified Lawn Care Companies 
 
 
With proper care, it is possible to have a sustainable, responsible and healthy lawn.     
In this section, you will find important information about services provided by ‘green-
certified’ lawn care companies. Please read the information carefully. We will ask a few 
questions following the information.   
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Q33  
Since 2015, Rhode Island (RI) has a “Green Certification” program for lawn care 
companies. As of January 2017, 10 lawn care companies are green-certified by the RI 
Department of Environmental Management.       
                                                                                                              
To be certified, lawn care companies must fulfill selected best management practices to 
protect water quality, conserve water, and contribute to the sustainability of the 
landscape.           
Here are some practices the green-certified companies have adopted:    
 mow appropriately (maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches),    
 fertilize appropriately (e.g., fertilize based on a soil test, use non-phosphorous, 
slow-release fertilizer),    
 use safer pesticides (e.g., use mostly granular pesticides to reduce product drift 
and customer exposure) etc. when maintaining lawns.           
Green-certified lawn care companies need to adopt additional best management 
practices to get re-certified every two years.         
The NEXT graphic summarizes these practices.        
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Q34  
Here is a summary of what GREEN-CERTIFIED lawn care companies do. 
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Q35   
If you would like to know more about the lawn care practices commonly adopted by 
green-certified lawn care, here are a few reputable sources*:   
University of Rhode Island's Stormwater Solutions:  
web.uri.edu/riss/take-action/simple-steps-at-home/around-the-yard/#FertilizeSparingly  
University of Connecticut's Sustainable Landscaping:   
http://www.sustainability.uconn.edu/sustain/turf/intro.html  
University of Massachusetts' Turf Program: 
https://ag.umass.edu/turf/publications-resources/best-management-practices          
If you decide to check these websites out now, please click the above links and come 
back to the survey within a few minutes to complete.        
*Please note that the best management practices on the websites above are examples of 
suggested practices. Each certified company chooses a set of practices to get green-
certified and may not all adopt the same practice.         
Did you check one or more of those websites? 
 Yes, I did. (1) 
 No, I did not. (2) 
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Q36  
In your opinion, which of the following lawn care practices do you think is effective in 
sustaining water quality? (Choose all that apply)    
 Conduct a soil test (1) 
 Maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches (2) 
 Fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer (3) 
 Clean up fertilizer from driveways, walkways, and roads after application (4) 
 Use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed (5) 
 Leave areas untreated around water bodies and wetlands (6) 
 None the above (7) 
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Q37  
Were you aware that Rhode Island has a Green Certification program for lawn care 
companies? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Selected 
And How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016? 
(In US dollars)&nbsp;&nbsp;(Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) $ Is Not Empty 
Q38  
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for their services for the entire season?      
You stated that you paid $ x for your services in 2016. Please use your payment for lawn 
care in 2016 as a reference.      
Imagine that the green-certified lawn care companies will offer you the same services 
as the company you hired in 2016, but use best management practices that 
minimize the impact on water quality. Examples include:      
• maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches   
• water efficiently   
• fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer   
• use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed.  
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Not Selected 
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex 
management Is Not Selected 
And How much did your household or the person managing your law spend in 
TOTAL in 2016 for your lawn care? (In US Dollars) Is Not Empty 
And How many hours per month on average did your household or the person 
managing your … Is Not Empty 
Q39 
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season? 
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly 
services:      
• Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate, to avoid 
over fertilizing 
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients   
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control   
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)   
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.               
For your information, you stated that your household spent $x annually and x hour(s) 
each month on average to take care of your lawn in 2016. Please use these figures as a 
reference. 
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Selected 
And How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016? 
(In US dollars)&nbsp;&nbsp;(Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) $ Is Empty 
Q40 
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for their services for the entire season?      
Imagine that the green-certified lawn care companies will offer you the same services 
as the company you hired in 2016, but use best management practices that 
minimize the impact on water quality. Examples include:      
• maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches   
•water efficiently   
• fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer   
• use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed.  
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Not Selected 
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex 
management Is Not Selected 
And How much did your household or the person managing your lawn spend in 
TOTAL in 2016 for your lawn care…  $ Is Empty 
Q41 
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season? 
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly 
services:     • Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate 
to avoid over fertilizing   
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients  
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control   
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)   
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.        
 
  
  
152 
 
Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Not Selected 
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex 
management Is Not Selected 
And There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If 
you were to hire...Is Not Displayed 
And How many hours per month o… Is Empty 
Q42 
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season? 
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly 
services: 
• Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate, to avoid 
over fertilizing 
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients 
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control 
• Pelletized limestone (early fall) 
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.     
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Information Treatment 3 (Q43 – Q58) 
Q43  
Part II---Section 1: Your lawn care and water quality     
 
 Here you will find information about how your lawn care can affect local water 
quality depending on how you manage it.  Please read the information carefully. We 
will ask you one question following the information. 
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Q44   
Data Sources:  
https://cfpub.epa.gov/npstbx/files/Norming_Survey_LawnCare_NewEngland_July201
0.pdf 
 http://www.stormwatercenter.net/Practice/131-Homeowner%20Survey.pdf 
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Q45  
In your opinion, which message from the previous figure was the most surprising to 
you? (Please choose one) 
 Improper fertilizer can be harmful to our drinking water, fish and other aquatic life. 
(1) 
 Proper lawn care can make a difference in protecting our drinking water, fish and 
other aquatic life. (2) 
 74% of households fertilize their lawns. (3) 
 Only 2% of households conduct a soil test before fertilizing their lawns. (4) 
 40% of the households use the whole bag of fertilizer to avoid storage. (5) 
 None of the above were surprising to me. (6) 
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Q46  
Part II---Section 2: About Green Certified Lawn Care Companies 
 
 
With proper care, it is possible to have a sustainable, responsible and healthy lawn.     
In this section, you will find important information about services provided by ‘green-
certified’ lawn care companies. Please read the information carefully. We will ask a few 
questions following the information.   
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Q47  
Since 2015, Rhode Island (RI) has a “Green Certification” program for lawn care 
companies. As of January 2017, 10 lawn care companies are green-certified by the RI 
Department of Environmental Management.       
                                                                                                              
To be certified, lawn care companies must fulfill selected best management practices to 
protect water quality, conserve water, and contribute to the sustainability of the 
landscape.           
Here are some practices the green-certified companies have adopted:    
 mow appropriately (maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches),    
 fertilize appropriately (e.g., fertilize based on a soil test, use non-phosphorous, 
slow-release fertilizer),    
 use safer pesticides (e.g., use mostly granular pesticides to reduce product drift 
and customer exposure) etc. when maintaining lawns.           
Green-certified lawn care companies need to adopt additional best management 
practices to get re-certified every two years.         
The NEXT graphic summarizes these practices.        
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Q48  
Here is a summary of what GREEN-CERTIFIED lawn care companies do. 
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Q49   
If you would like to know more about the lawn care practices commonly adopted by 
green-certified lawn care, here are a few reputable sources*:   
University of Rhode Island's Stormwater Solutions:  
web.uri.edu/riss/take-action/simple-steps-at-home/around-the-yard/#FertilizeSparingly  
University of Connecticut's Sustainable Landscaping:   
http://www.sustainability.uconn.edu/sustain/turf/intro.html  
University of Massachusetts' Turf Program: 
https://ag.umass.edu/turf/publications-resources/best-management-practices          
If you decide to check these websites out now, please click the above links and come 
back to the survey within a few minutes to complete.        
*Please note that the best management practices on the websites above are examples of 
suggested practices. Each certified company chooses a set of practices to get green-
certified and may not all adopt the same practice.         
Did you check one or more of those websites? 
 Yes, I did. (1) 
 No, I did not. (2) 
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Q50  
In your opinion, which of the following lawn care practices do you think is effective in 
sustaining water quality? (Choose all that apply)    
 Conduct a soil test (1) 
 Maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches (2) 
 Fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer (3) 
 Clean up fertilizer from driveways, walkways, and roads after application (4) 
 Use safer pesticides and do not spread more needed (5) 
 Leave areas untreated around water bodies and wetlands (6) 
 None the above (7) 
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Q51  
Below is additional information about GREEN-CERTIFIED lawn care companies.  
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Q52  
Based on the previous figure, how much do you agree with the following statement: 
"Many residents in Rhode Island are already hiring Green Certified lawn care 
businesses."? 
 Extremely agree (1) 
 Moderately agree (2) 
 Slightly agree (3) 
 Slightly disagree (4) 
 Moderately disagree (5) 
 Extremely disagree (6) 
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Q53  
Were you aware that Rhode Island has a Green Certification program for lawn care 
companies? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Selected 
And How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016? 
(In US dollars)&nbsp;&nbsp;(Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) $ Is Not Empty 
Q54  
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for their services for the entire season?      
You stated that you paid $ x for your services in 2016. Please use your payment for lawn 
care in 2016 as a reference.      
Imagine that the green-certified lawn care companies will offer you the same services 
as the company you hired in 2016, but use best management practices that 
minimize the impact on water quality. Examples include:      
• maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches   
• water efficiently   
• fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer   
• use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed.  
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Not Selected 
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex 
management Is Not Selected 
And How much did your household or the person managing your law spend in 
TOTAL in 2016 for your lawn care? (In US Dollars) Is Not Empty 
And How many hours per month on average did your household or the person 
managing your … Is Not Empty 
Q55 
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season? 
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly 
services:      
• Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate, to avoid 
over fertilizing 
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients   
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control   
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)   
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.               
For your information, you stated that your household spent $x annually and x hour(s) 
each month on average to take care of your lawn in 2016. Please use these figures as a 
reference. 
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Selected 
And How much did your household spend to hire the lawn care company in 2016? 
(In US dollars)&nbsp;&nbsp;(Please enter a NUMBER in the box.) $ Is Empty 
Q56 
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for their services for the entire season?      
Imagine that the green-certified lawn care companies will offer you the same services 
as the company you hired in 2016, but use best management practices that 
minimize the impact on water quality. Examples include:      
• maintain a lawn height of 3-4 inches   
•water efficiently   
• fertilize properly using non-phosphorous, slow-release fertilizer   
• use safer pesticides and do not spread more than needed.  
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Not Selected 
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex 
management Is Not Selected 
And How much did your household or the person managing your lawn spend in 
TOTAL in 2016 for your lawn care…  $ Is Empty 
Q57 
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season? 
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly 
services:     • Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate 
to avoid over fertilizing   
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients  
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control   
• Pelletized limestone (early fall)   
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.        
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Display This Question: 
If Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Lawn care company Is 
Not Selected 
And Who primarily maintains your lawn? (Please choose one) Landlord/Complex 
management Is Not Selected 
And There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If 
you were to hire...Is Not Displayed 
And How many hours per month o… Is Empty 
Q58 
There are several green-certified lawn care companies that serve your area. If you were 
to hire a green certified lawn care company to manage your lawn in 2017, how much 
would you be willing to pay for these services for the entire season? 
Imagine that a green-certified company will offer you the following eco-friendly 
services: 
• Five applications of fertilizer from early spring to late fall, at a proper rate, to avoid 
over fertilizing 
• Use organic, slow-release fertilizer with micronutrients 
• Broad-leaf weed and crabgrass control 
• Pelletized limestone (early fall) 
• Removal of materials from walks & drives to minimize runoff.     
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One of the following four treatments will be randomly displayed at the same 
probability for each survey. (The second treatment and the third treatment are 
identical.) 
 
Financial incentive Treatment 1: no incentive (Q59- Q60) 
Q59  
Given the information provided to you, how likely are you going to hire a green-
certified lawn care company to manage your lawn? (Please choose one) 
 Extremely likely (1) 
 Moderately likely (2) 
 Slightly likely (3) 
 Slightly unlikely (4) 
 Moderately unlikely (5) 
 Extremely unlikely (6) 
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Q60  
What factors would affect your decision to contract into a green-certified lawn care 
company? (Choose all that apply)  
 How much it costs annually (1) 
 The type of services provided (e.g., mowing, watering, fertilizing, etc.) (2) 
 Number of visits for treatment (3) 
 Type of environmentally-friendly practices (4) 
 Other [please specify] (5) ____________________ 
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Financial incentive Treatment 2: 25% of contract (Q61 – Q64) 
Q61  
Congratulations!       
You have been randomly selected to receive a rebate of 25% of your first year’s 
annual contract fee with a green-certified lawn care company (up to $75). The rebate 
is sponsored by a research grant.            
Don’t miss this opportunity---this limited offer is valid only for contracts signed by May 
31, 2017.             
This is an actual rebate offer for you. If you contract with one of the three green-certified 
lawn care companies listed at the end of this survey, you will receive the 
rebate.                                                           
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Q62  
How important is the rebate to your decision? 
 Extremely important (1) 
 Moderately important (2) 
 Slightly important (3) 
 Slightly unimportant (4) 
 Moderately unimportant (5) 
 Extremely unimportant (6) 
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Q63  
Given the information and rebate provided to you, how likely are you going to hire a 
green-certified lawn care company to manage your lawn? (Please choose one)     Note: 
This is an actual rebate offer for you. If you contract with one of the three green-certified 
lawn care companies listed at the end of this survey, you will receive the rebate.      
 Extremely likely (1) 
 Moderately likely (2) 
 Slightly likely (3) 
 Slightly unlikely (4) 
 Moderately unlikely (5) 
 Extremely unlikely (6) 
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Q64  
What factors would affect your decision to contract into a green-certified lawn care 
company? (Choose all that apply)  
 How much it costs annually (1) 
 The type of services provided (e.g., mowing, watering, fertilizing, etc.) (2) 
 Number of visits for treatment (3) 
 Type of environmentally-friendly practices (4) 
 Other [please specify] (5) ____________________ 
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Financial incentive Treatment 3: 25% of contract (Q65 – Q68) 
Q65  
Congratulations!       
You have been randomly selected to receive a rebate of 25% of your first year’s 
annual contract fee with a green-certified lawn care company (up to $75). The rebate 
is sponsored by a research grant.            
Don’t miss this opportunity---this limited offer is valid only for contracts signed by May 
31, 2017.             
This is an actual rebate offer for you. If you contract with one of the three green-certified 
lawn care companies listed at the end of this survey, you will receive the 
rebate.                                                           
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Q66  
How important is the rebate to your decision? 
 Extremely important (1) 
 Moderately important (2) 
 Slightly important (3) 
 Slightly unimportant (4) 
 Moderately unimportant (5) 
 Extremely unimportant (6) 
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Q67  
Given the information and rebate provided to you, how likely are you going to hire a 
green-certified lawn care company to manage your lawn? (Please choose one)     Note: 
This is an actual rebate offer for you. If you contract with one of the three green-certified 
lawn care companies listed at the end of this survey, you will receive the rebate.      
 Extremely likely (1) 
 Moderately likely (2) 
 Slightly likely (3) 
 Slightly unlikely (4) 
 Moderately unlikely (5) 
 Extremely unlikely (6) 
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Q68  
What factors would affect your decision to contract into a green-certified lawn care 
company? (Choose all that apply)  
 How much it costs annually (1) 
 The type of services provided (e.g., mowing, watering, fertilizing, etc.) (2) 
 Number of visits for treatment (3) 
 Type of environmentally-friendly practices (4) 
 Other [please specify] (5) ____________________ 
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Financial incentive Treatment 4: 50% of contract (Q69 – Q72) 
Q69  
Congratulations!       
You have been randomly selected to receive a rebate of 50% of your first year’s 
annual contract fee with a green-certified lawn care company (up to $150). The rebate 
is sponsored by a research grant.            
Don’t miss this opportunity---this limited offer is valid only for contracts signed by May 
31, 2017.             
This is an actual rebate offer for you. If you contract with one of the three green-certified 
lawn care companies listed at the end of this survey, you will receive the 
rebate.                                                           
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Q70  
How important is the rebate to your decision? 
 Extremely important (1) 
 Moderately important (2) 
 Slightly important (3) 
 Slightly unimportant (4) 
 Moderately unimportant (5) 
 Extremely unimportant (6) 
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Q71  
Given the information and rebate provided to you, how likely are you going to hire a 
green-certified lawn care company to manage your lawn? (Please choose one)     Note: 
This is an actual rebate offer for you. If you contract with one of the three green-certified 
lawn care companies listed at the end of this survey, you will receive the rebate.      
 Extremely likely (1) 
 Moderately likely (2) 
 Slightly likely (3) 
 Slightly unlikely (4) 
 Moderately unlikely (5) 
 Extremely unlikely (6) 
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Q72  
What factors would affect your decision to contract into a green-certified lawn care 
company? (Choose all that apply)  
 How much it costs annually (1) 
 The type of services provided (e.g., mowing, watering, fertilizing, etc.) (2) 
 Number of visits for treatment (3) 
 Type of environmentally-friendly practices (4) 
 Other [please specify] (5) ____________________ 
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Survey Part III: Contract (Q73 – Q81) 
 
Q73 
 
Part III: Contracting with a green-certified lawn care company 
  
In this section, please tell us whether you are interested in getting more information 
about green-certified lawn care companies. 
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Q74 
 For this research project, the researchers at University of Rhode Island are collaborating 
with the following three green-certified lawn care companies (in alphabetical order):      
A Cut Above (http://rilawncare.com/)   
Dana Designs (http://danalandscapedesigns.com/)   
SeaScape (http://seascapeinc.com/)      
Are you interested in signing up here to receive more information about their 
services?    
If you sign up, one or more of the three green-certified lawn care companies serving 
your area will contact you to give you more information, including a free estimate. 
 Yes, I am interested in signing up. (1) 
 No, I am not interested at this time. (2) 
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Display This Question: 
If Would you be interested in getting lawn care services from one green certified 
lawn care company? Yes Is Selected 
Q75 Please leave your name, phone number and email address below. One or more of 
the three green-certified lawn care companies serving your area will contact you to give 
you more information. 
Display This Question: 
If Would you be interested in getting lawn care services from one green certified 
lawn care company? Yes Is Selected 
Q76 Your first name: 
 
Display This Question: 
If The researchers at the University of Rhode Island are collaborating with three 
green-certified lawn c... Yes, I am interested in obtaining more information. Is Selected 
Q77 Your last name: 
 
Display This Question: 
If Would you be interested in getting lawn care services from one green certified 
lawn care company? Yes Is Selected 
Q78 Your phone number (please include the three-digit area code): 
 
Display This Question: 
If Would you be interested in getting lawn care services from one green certified 
lawn care company? <o:p></o:p> Yes Is Selected 
Q79 Your email address: 
 
Display This Question: 
If The researchers at the University of Rhode Island are collaborating with three 
green-certified lawn c... Yes, I am interested in obtaining more information. Is Selected 
Q80 Please re-type your email address here to verify it.  
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Display This Question: 
If The researchers at the University of Rhode Island are collaborating with three 
green-certified lawn c... No Is Selected 
Q81  
Would you mind telling us why you are not interested in signing up to get information 
from green-certified lawn care companies? (Choose all that apply)   
 I do not want to change from my current contractor. (1) 
 I already have a good relationship with my current contractor. (2) 
 I do not think practices by green certified lawn care companies help improve water 
quality. (3) 
 I do not want to give away my personal information. (4) 
 Hiring a lawn care professional is too expensive. (5) 
 I prefer to managing my lawn by myself. (6) 
 Other [Please specify] (7) ____________________ 
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Survey Part IV (Q82 – Q96) 
Q82  
Part IV: A bit about you     
In this section, we will ask a few questions about you and your household. 
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Q83  
What is your gender? 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
 Prefer not to answer (3) 
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Q84  
What is your age? 
 18-24 years old (1) 
 25-34 years old (2) 
 35-44 years old (3) 
 45-54 years old (4) 
 55-64 years old (5) 
 65-74 years old (6) 
 75 years or older (7) 
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Q85  
Which of the following best describes the highest level of education you have 
completed? 
 Less than 12 years, no high school diploma (1) 
 High School (2) 
 GED (3) 
 Some college (4) 
 Trade Certificate (5) 
 Bachelor’s Degree (6) 
 Master’s degree or higher (7) 
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Q86  
What was your household’s total income (before taxes) in 2016? 
 Less than $20,000 (1) 
 $20,000 to $39,999 (2) 
 $40,000 to $59,999 (3) 
 $60,000 to $79,999 (4) 
 $80,000 to $99,999 (5) 
 $100,000 to $149,999 (6) 
 $150,000 or more (7) 
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Q87 Please rate the 
effect of the 
following 
interventions to 
improve water 
quality in your area. 
Very 
effective (1) 
Effective (2) 
Somewhat 
effective (3) 
Not effective 
(4) 
Control industrial 
pollution  
        
Use best 
management 
practices for lawn 
care  
        
Control agricultural 
pollution  
        
Clean pet waste          
Manage sewage 
pollution  
        
Manage stormwater 
pollution  
        
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Q88 Please 
indicate 
how 
strongly 
you agree 
or disagree 
with each 
of the 
following 
statements. 
Complet
ely agree 
(6)  
Agre
e (5) 
Somew
hat 
agree 
(4) 
Neithe
r agree 
nor 
disagr
ee (3) 
Somew
hat 
disagree 
(2) 
Disagr
ee (1) 
Complet
ely 
disagree 
(0) 
We are 
approachin
g the limit 
of the 
number of 
people the 
earth can 
support.  
              
Humans 
have the 
right to 
modify the 
natural 
environme
nt to suit 
their needs.  
              
When 
humans 
interfere 
with nature 
it often 
produces 
disastrous 
consequenc
es. 
              
Human 
ingenuity 
will insure 
that we do 
not make 
the Earth 
unlivable.  
              
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Humans are 
seriously 
abusing the 
environme
nt.  
              
The Earth 
has plenty 
of natural 
resources if 
we just 
learn how 
to develop 
them.  
              
Plants and 
animals 
have as 
much right 
as humans 
to exist.  
              
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Q89 
Please 
indicate 
how 
strongly 
you agree 
or 
disagree 
with each 
of the 
following 
statements
. 
Complete
ly agree 
(6) 
Agre
e (5) 
Somewh
at agree 
(4) 
Neithe
r agree 
nor 
disagr
ee (3) 
Somewh
at 
disagree 
(2) 
Disagr
ee (1) 
Complete
ly 
disagree 
(0) 
The 
balance of 
nature is 
strong 
enough to 
cope with 
the 
impacts of 
modern 
industrial 
nations.  
              
Despite 
our 
special 
abilities,
， 
humans 
are still 
subject to 
the laws of 
nature.  
              
The so-
called 
“ecologica
l crisis” 
facing 
humankin
d has been 
greatly 
exaggerat
ed.  
              
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The earth 
is like a 
spaceship 
with very 
limited 
room and 
resources. 
              
Humans 
were 
meant to 
rule over 
the rest of 
nature.  
              
The 
balance of 
nature is 
very 
delicate 
and easily 
upset.  
              
Humans 
will 
eventually 
learn 
enough 
about how 
nature 
works to 
be able to 
control it.  
              
If things 
continue 
on their 
present 
course, we 
will soon 
experienc
e a major 
ecological 
catastroph
e. 
              
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Q90 Check the 
category on the 
right that conforms 
to the frequency 
with which you 
have carried out 
the following acts. 
Never (0) Once (1) 
More than 
once (2) 
Often (3) 
Very 
often (4) 
I have helped push 
a stranger’s car out 
of the snow. (1) 
          
I have given 
directions to a 
stranger. (2) 
          
I have made 
change for a 
stranger. (3) 
          
I have given 
money to a charity. 
(4) 
          
I have given 
money to a 
stranger who 
needed it (or asked 
me for it). (5) 
          
I have donated 
goods or clothes to 
a charity. (6) 
          
I have done 
volunteer work for 
a charity. (7) 
          
I have donated 
blood. (8) 
          
I have helped carry 
a stranger’s 
belongings (books, 
parcels, etc.). (9) 
          
I have delayed an 
elevator and held 
the door open for a 
stranger. (10) 
          
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Q91 Check the category 
on the right that conforms 
to the frequency with 
which you have carried 
out the following acts. 
Never 
(0) 
Once (1) 
More 
than 
once (2) 
Often (3) 
Very 
often (4) 
I have allowed someone 
to go ahead of me in a 
lineup (at photocopy 
machine, in the 
supermarket).  
          
I have given a stranger a 
lift in my car.  
          
I have pointed out a 
clerk’s error (in a bank, at 
the supermarket) in 
undercharging me for an 
item.  
          
I have let a neighbor 
whom I didn’t know too 
well borrow an item of 
some value to me (e.g., a 
dish, tools, etc.)  
          
I have bought ‘charity” 
Christmas cards 
deliberately because I 
knew it was a good cause.  
          
I have helped a classmate 
who I did not know that 
well with a homework 
assignment when my 
knowledge was greater 
than his or hers.  
          
I have before being asked, 
voluntarily looked after a 
neighbor’s pets or 
children without being 
paid for it. 
          
I have offered to help a 
handicapped or elderly 
stranger across a street.  
          
I have offered my seat on 
a bus or train to a stranger 
who was standing.  
          
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I have helped an 
acquaintance to move 
households. (20) 
          
 
Display This Question: 
If Please re-type your email here to verify it. Text Response Is Empty 
Q92 As a small gift, we would like to send you a $2 Amazon e-gift card. You can either 
use it yourself or give it to someone by simply forwarding the email you will receive 
from Amazon.com. For example, you can donate to your child’s school or other 
organizations. Please leave your email address below. By typing your email below, you 
give us permission to send your email to amazon.com. Make sure your email address is 
typed correctly.               
You can also forgo the Amazon e-gift card by simply leaving the following space 
blank.           
 
Display This Question: 
If Please re-type your email here to verify it. Text Response Is Not Empty 
Q93 As a small gift, we would like to send you a $2 Amazon e-gift card to the email 
address you provided in Part III. You can either use it yourself or give it to someone by 
simply forwarding the email. For example, you can donate to your child’s school or 
other organizations. Would you like a $2 Amazon e-gift card? By choosing "Yes", you 
give us permission to send your email to amazon.com.  
 Yes, please email me the e-gift card. (2) 
 No, thanks. (3) 
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Display This Question: 
If As a small gift, we would like to send you a $2 Amazon e-gift card. Please leave 
your email addre... Text Response Is Not Empty 
And As a small gift, we would like to send you a $2 Amazon e-gift card. Please leave 
your email addre... Text Response Is Displayed 
Q94  
Please re-type your email here to verify it.  
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Display This Question: 
If As a small gift, we would like to send you a $2 Amazon e-gift card.   You can 
either use it yours... Text Response Is Not Empty 
Or As a small gift, we would like to send you a $2 Amazon e-gift card to the email 
address you provi... Yes, please email me the e-gift card. Is Selected 
Q95 We will email you a $2 Amazon e-gift card to your email address. Please sign 
(type) your name below. With this signature, you assure us that:       
1. You are the only person in your household who will take this survey.   
2. You understand that you will receive a $2 Amazon e-gift card within one week after 
you finish the survey.   
3. You allow us to share your email address with amazon.com.      
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Q96  
Thank you for your time!           
If you have additional comments, please indicate in the box below.    
 
 
------------------------------------------------End of Survey --------------------------------------
---------- 
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Appendix II: A list of organizations who distributed our survey 
Quest School 
Westerly Public Schools 
Cranston Public Schools 
Compass School 
Kingston Hill Academy 
Aquidneck Land Trust 
Save the Bay 
Environment Justice League 
The Nature Conservancy 
Wood-Pawcatuck Watershed Association 
Woonasquatucket River Watershed Council 
URI Master Gardeners 
Northern Rhode Island Conservation District 
Eastern RI Conservation District 
RI Rivers Council 
 Watershed Watch 
Blackstone River Watershed Association 
Briggs Farm Improvement Association 
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Appendix III: An example of recruitment advertisement 
 
 
 
Passionate about water quality issues? 
 
National Science Foundation funded survey 
conducted by URI researchers will collect 
information related to lawn care and water 
quality. Please fill out by March 31st. 
Participants receive $2 Amazon credit. 
We are counting on YOU 
 
Approved by URI’s IRB. 
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Appendix IV: Experiment instructions 
Appendix 4.1: Certainty treatments 
Instructions (Part I) 
 
This experiment is a study of individual and group decision-making. If you follow these 
instructions carefully and make informed decisions, you will earn money. The money 
you earn will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment. 
 
You will be in a group consisting of six players. Each player plays the role of a firm. 
Your firm and five other firms are located near a lake next to a town. Anyone in the 
town can access the lake to go fishing, swimming or boating. 
 
Your firm makes money through its production. Production also generates emissions, 
which affect the water quality of the lake. In general, the higher your production the 
more you earn from production, but the greater the emissions your firm generates. Firm 
earnings are denominated in “experimental dollars”, which will be exchanged for cash 
at the end of the experiment at the rate of 2150 experimental dollars to $1. 
 
This experiment is broken up into three parts and 100 decision “rounds”, 45 rounds in 
Part I, 45rounds in Part II and 10 rounds in Part III. Each round is independent, meaning 
that decisions during a round do not affect future rounds in any way. In each round your 
task is to choose among six management options, labeled “A” through “F”. These 
options remain constant throughout the experiment. Associated with each management 
option is: (1) a production level (Production); (2) the emissions generated (Emissions); 
and (3) the number of experimental dollars you earn from product sales (Earnings from 
Production). Your final earnings at the end of the experiment is whatever you earn in 
the 100 rounds based on you and your group members’ decisions, plus a show-up fee of 
$ 5. 
 
You have been provided the following table (Table 1) titled “Initial Earnings” that lists 
the emissions, levels of production, and earnings from production that are associated 
with each management option. Please refer to this table before making any decisions. 
 
Table 1: Initial Earnings  
 
Management Option Emissions Production 
Earnings from production 
(Experimental Dollars) 
A 6 150 800 
B 5 138 797 
C 4 123 786 
D 3 108 764 
E 2 89 725 
F 1 66 655 
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Your firm’s emissions will result in pollution in the lake. Pollution affects the well-
being of all lake users. For example, high pollution levels affect the health of fish, 
causing losses to the fisherman. To protect the water resource, an environmental 
regulator requires you, and all other firms in your group, to pay the following Tax on 
pollution: 
 
Tax = 30 * Total Pollution 
 
Total Pollution equals the total of your firm’s emissions and the other five players’ 
emissions. In other words, the total pollution is based on the management decision of 
everyone in your group, not just your own. 
 
A round of the experiment is complete when all six players have made their management 
decision by choosing from the six management options listed on your computer screen. 
After every player makes his or her management decision, Total Pollution will be 
calculated by the computer. The Tax will be calculated using the formula above. For 
each round, your Total Earnings is calculated as follows: 
 
Total Earnings = Earnings from Production – Tax 
 
Your computer will show your Management Options, your Earnings from 
Production, the Total Pollution, the Tax and your Total Earnings from the current 
round and all previous rounds. Your computer will also show you other five players’ 
Management Options after everyone makes their decision in one round. 
 
Here is an example of how to calculate your Total Earnings. If in one round each of 
five others in your group chooses option E and has an individual emission of 2 and you 
choose option A and have an individual emission of 6, the Total Pollution will be 16. 
Everyone in your group will pay a tax that is equal to 480 experimental dollars. Your 
total earnings in this round will be 800 – 480 = 320 experimental dollars. 
 
Here is another example. If in one round all of you choose option A and each of you 
have an individual emission of 6, the Total Pollution will be 36. Everyone in your group 
will pay a tax that is equal to 1080 experimental dollars. Your total earnings in this 
round will be 800 – 1080 = -220 experimental dollars, which means you lose 220 
experimental dollars. 
 
It is important that you understand the instructions and the experiment. We will ask you 
a few questions before you make any decisions in the experiment. The computer will 
check your answers automatically. If you do not get the correct answers after a few 
attempts, please let the experiment administrator know and he or she will be happy to 
explain them to you. 
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Please do not turn to next 
page unless experimenters 
ask you to do so. 
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Instructions (Part II) 
 
You will make another 45 decisions in this part. Everything in the game will keep the 
same except that other firms’ management option choices in your group will not be 
given to you anymore. Please also read the instructions in Part I to make any decisions 
if you need it.  
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Appendix 4.2: Low uncertainty treatments 
Instructions (Part I) 
 
This experiment is a study of individual and group decision-making. If you follow these 
instructions carefully and make informed decisions, you will earn money. The money 
you earn will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment. 
 
You will be in a group consisting of six players. Each player plays the role of a firm. 
Your firm and five other firms are located near a lake next to a town. Anyone in the 
town can access the lake to go fishing, swimming or boating. 
 
Your firm makes money through its production. Production also generates emissions, 
which affect the water quality of the lake. In general, the higher your production, the 
more you earn from production, but the greater the emissions your firm generates. Firm 
earnings are denominated in “experimental dollars”, which will be exchanged for cash 
at the end of the experiment at the rate of 1750 experimental dollars to $1. 
 
This experiment is broken up into three parts and 100 decision “rounds”, 45 rounds in 
Part I, 45rounds in Part II and 10 rounds in Part III. Each round is independent, meaning 
that decisions during a round do not affect future rounds in any way. In each round your 
task is to choose among six management options, labeled “A” through “F”. These 
options remain constant throughout the experiment. Associated with each management 
option is: (1) a production level (Production); (2) the average emissions generated 
(Average Emissions); and (3) the number of experimental dollars you earn from 
product sales (Earnings from Production). Your final earnings at the end of the 
experiment is whatever you earn in the 100 rounds based on you and your group 
members’ decisions, plus a show-up fee of $ 5. 
 
You have been provided the following table (Table 1) titled “Initial Earnings” that lists 
the emissions, levels of production, and earnings from production that are associated 
with each management option. Please refer to this table before making any decisions. 
 
 
Table 1: Initial Earnings  
 
Management Option Average Emissions Production 
Earnings from production 
(Experimental Dollars) 
A 6 150 800 
B 5 138 797 
C 4 123 786 
D 3 108 764 
E 2 89 725 
F 1 66 655 
 
In addition to the management option, you and other firms choose, a variety of 
uncontrollable factors affect emissions of your firm. For example, heavy rainfall can 
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increase the amount of water that flows over the land surface, increasing emissions. You 
cannot control those factors. However, the average resulting emissions of each 
management option can be estimated based on scientific data. For example, if you 
choose management option A, emissions of your firm could be below 6 or above 6, but 
on average emissions would be 6. In other words, if you choose option A many times 
and calculate the average of the resulting emissions, the average will be about 6. Table 
2 gives details of management options and associated probabilities of emissions.  
 
The probabilities listed in Table 2 list the chance that a certain level of emissions are 
observed. To understand these probabilities, consider a lottery machine that has 100 
balls numbered 1 through 100. If randomly drawn, any one ball has a 1% chance of 
being drawn because there are 100 balls. Larger probabilities can be considered by 
thinking about groups of balls. For instance, there is a 50% probability of a ball being 
drawn at random that has a number on it greater than 50 because half the 100 balls have 
a number greater than 50. In other words, if you choose balls from the lottery many 
times, about half of the balls you choose will be with numbers greater than 50. 
 
 
Table 2: Probability of emissions levels and associated management options 
 
 
 
 
 
Manageme
nt Option 
 
 
 
Average 
emissio
ns 
Probabilities 
Emissio
ns 0-1 
Emissio
ns 1-2 
Emissio
ns  2-3 
Emissio
ns  3-4 
Emissio
ns 4-5 
Emissio
ns 5-6 
Emissio
ns  > 6 
A 
6 0.04% 2.53% 
10.22
% 
15.95
% 
16.69
% 
14.44
% 
40.13
% 
B 
5  0.15% 5.53% 
16.34
% 
20.20
% 
17.65
% 
13.19
% 
26.94
% 
C 
4 0.58% 
12.21
% 
24.45
% 
22.63
% 
15.82
% 
9.88% 
14.44
% 
D 
3 2.58% 
26.17
% 
31.13
% 
19.67
% 
10.28
% 
5.09% 5.09% 
E 
2 
12.79
% 
47.08
% 
25.69
% 
9.35% 3.22% 1.14% 0.72% 
F 
1 
59.87
% 
35.04
% 4.37% 0.59% 0.10% 0.02% 
0.01% 
 
To fully understand Table 2, we further explain some examples.  
 
Take a look at the first row. If you choose management option A in many rounds, the 
emissions of your firm will be 6 on average indicated by the number in the first cell. 
However, in any specific round, your firm’s emissions might be different from 6.  
 
The second cell tells us that there is 0.04% chance that the emission level is equal or 
less than 1. It means if you choose management option A in 10,000 rounds, 
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approximately 4 times your firm’s emissions are less than or equal to 1. In other words, 
the chance having an emission level between 0 and 1 if you choose option A is same as 
the chance picking the balls numbered from 1 through 4 from a 10, 000 ball numbered 
from 1 through 10,000. 
 
The next cell shows that the chance for your firm of emitting between 1 and 2 is 2.53%. 
It means the chance of having an emission level between 1 and 2 if you choose option 
A is the same as the chance of picking the balls numbered from 1 through 253 from a 
10, 000 ball numbered from 1 through 10,000. In other words, if you choose 
management option A in 10,000 rounds, for about 253 times your firm’s emissions are 
greater than 1 and less than 2. 
Finally, the chance for your firm of emitting greater than 6 is 40.13%, noted by the last 
cell.  It means the chance of having an emission level greater than 6 if you choose option 
A is the same as the chance of picking the balls numbered from 1 through 4,013 from a 
10, 000 ball numbered from 1 through 10,000.  In other words, if you choose 
management option A in 10,000 rounds, for about 4,013 times your firm’s emissions is 
greater than 6. 
 
In general, your firm’s emissions are more likely to be lower if you choose a 
management option with low average emissions. Likewise, your firm’s emissions are 
more likely to be higher if you choose a management option with high average 
emissions.  
 
Your firm’s emissions will result in pollution in the lake. Pollution affects the well-
being of all lake users. For example, high pollution levels affect the health of fish, 
causing losses to fisherman. In order to protect the water resource, an environmental 
regulator requires you, and all other firms in your group, to pay the following Tax on 
pollution: 
 
Tax = 30 * Total Pollution  
 
Total Pollution equals the total of your firm’s emissions and the other five players’ 
emissions. In other words, the total pollution is based on the management decision of 
everyone in your group, not just your own.  
 
A round of the experiment is complete when all six players have made their management 
decision by choosing from the six management options listed on your computer screen. 
After every player makes his or her management decision, Total Pollution will be 
calculated by the computer. The Tax will be calculated using the formula above. For 
each round, your Total Earnings is calculated as follows: 
 
Total Earnings = Earnings from Production – Tax 
 
Your computer will show your Management Options, your Earnings from 
Production, the Total Pollution, the Tax and your Total Earnings from the current 
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round and all previous rounds. Your computer will also show you other five players’ 
Management Options after everyone makes their decision in one round. 
 
Here is one example of how to calculate your Total Earnings. If in one round each of 
five others in your group chooses option E and has an individual emission of 2 and you 
choose option A and have an individual emission of 6, the Total Pollution will be 16. 
Everyone in your group will pay a tax that is equal to 480 experimental dollars. Your 
total earnings in this round will be 800 – 480 = 320 experimental dollars. 
 
Here is another example. If in one round all of you choose option A and each of you 
have an individual emission of 6, the total pollution will be 36. Everyone in your group 
will pay a tax that is equal to 1080 experimental dollars. Your total earnings in this 
round will be 800 – 1080 = -220 experimental dollars, which means you lose 220 
experimental dollars. 
 
It is important that you understand the instructions and the experiment. We will ask you 
a few questions before you make any decisions in the experiment. The computer will 
check your answers automatically. If you do not get the correct answers after a few 
attempts, please let the experiment administrator know and he or she will be happy to 
explain them to you. 
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Please do not turn to next 
page unless experimenters 
ask you to do so. 
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Instructions (Part II) 
 
You will make another 45 decisions in this part. Everything in the game will keep the 
same except that other firms’ management option choices in your group will not be 
given to you anymore. Please also read the instructions in Part I to make any decisions 
if you need it.  
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Appendix 4.3: High uncertainty treatments 
Instructions (Part I) 
 
This experiment is a study of individual and group decision-making. If you follow these 
instructions carefully and make informed decisions, you will earn money. The money 
you earn will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment. 
 
You will be in a group consisting of six players. Each player plays the role of a firm. 
Your firm and five other firms are located near a lake next to a town. Anyone in the 
town can access the lake to go fishing, swimming or boating. 
 
Your firm makes money through its production. Production also generates emissions, 
which affect the water quality of the lake. In general, the higher your production the 
more you earn from production, but the greater the emissions your firm generates. Firm 
earnings are denominated in “experimental dollars”, which will be exchanged for cash 
at the end of the experiment at the rate of 1750 experimental dollars to $1. 
 
This experiment is broken up into three parts and 100 decision “rounds”, 45 rounds in 
Part I, 45rounds in Part II and 10 rounds in Part III. Each round is independent, meaning 
that decisions during a round do not affect future rounds in any way. In each round your 
task is to choose among six management options, labeled “A” through “F”. These 
options remain constant throughout the experiment. Associated with each management 
option is: (1) a production level (Production); (2) the average emissions generated 
(Average Emissions); and (3) the number of experimental dollars you earn from 
product sales (Earnings from Production). Your final earnings at the end of the 
experiment is whatever you earn in the 100 rounds based on you and your group 
members’ decisions, plus a show-up fee of $ 5. 
 
You have been provided the following table (Table 1) titled “Initial Earnings” that lists 
the emissions, levels of production, and earnings from production that are associated 
with each management option. Please refer to this table before making any decisions. 
 
Table 1: Initial Earnings  
 
Management Option Average Emissions Production 
Earnings from production 
(Experimental Dollars) 
A 6 150 800 
B 5 138 797 
C 4 123 786 
D 3 108 764 
E 2 89 725 
F 1 66 655 
 
In addition to the management option, you and other firms choose, a variety of 
uncontrollable factors affect emissions of your firm. For example, heavy rainfall can 
increase the amount of water that flows over the land surface, increasing emissions. You 
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cannot control those factors. However, the average resulting emissions of each 
management option can be estimated based on scientific data. For example, if you 
choose management option A, emissions of your firm could be below 6 or above 6, but 
on average emissions would be 6. In other words, if you choose option A many times 
and calculate the average of the resulting emissions, the average will be about 6. Table 
2 gives details of management options and associated probabilities of emissions.  
 
The probabilities listed in Table 2 list the chance that a certain level of emissions are 
observed. To understand these probabilities, consider a lottery machine that has 100 
balls numbered 1 through 100. If randomly drawn, any one ball has a 1% chance of 
being drawn because there are 100 balls. Larger probabilities can be considered by 
thinking about groups of balls. For instance, there is a 50% probability of a ball being 
drawn at random that has a number on it greater than 50 because half the 100 balls have 
a number greater than 50. In other words, if you choose balls from the lottery many 
times, about half of the balls you choose will be with numbers greater than 50. 
 
Table 2: Probability of emissions levels and associated management options 
 
 
 
 
 
Manageme
nt Option 
 
 
 
Average 
emissio
ns 
Probabilities 
Emissio
ns 0-1 
Emissio
ns 1-2 
Emissio
ns  2-3 
Emissio
ns  3-4 
Emissio
ns 4-5 
Emissio
ns 5-6 
Emissio
ns  > 6 
A 6 9.82% 17.65% 14.87% 11.42% 8.70% 6.68% 30.85% 
B 5  13.36% 20.50% 15.71% 11.34% 8.24% 6.10% 24.75% 
C 4 18.77% 23.57% 16.06% 10.74% 7.37% 5.22% 18.26% 
D 3 27.47% 26.29% 15.38% 9.31% 5.94% 3.96% 11.64% 
E 2 42.34% 26.80% 12.59% 6.62% 3.81% 2.34% 5.50% 
F 1 69.15% 19.21% 6.15% 2.53% 1.22% 0.65% 1.10% 
 
To fully understand Table 2, we further explain some examples.  
 
Take a look at the first row. If you choose management option A in many rounds, the 
emissions of your firm will be 6 on average indicated by the number in the first cell. 
However, in any specific round, your firm’s emissions might be different from 6.  
 
The second cell tells us that there is 9.82% chance that the emission level is equal or 
less than 1. It means if you choose management option A in 10,000 rounds, 
approximately 982 times your firm’s emissions are less than or equal to 1. In other 
words, the chance having an emission level between 0 and 1 if you choose option A is 
same as the chance picking the balls numbered from 1 through 982 from a 10, 000 ball 
numbered from 1 through 10,000. 
 
The next cell shows that the chance for your firm of emitting between 1 and 2 is 17.65%. 
It means the chance of having an emission level between 1 and 2 if you choose option 
A is the same as the chance of picking the balls numbered from 1 through 1,765 from a 
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10, 000 ball numbered from 1 through 10,000. In other words, if you choose 
management option A in 10,000 rounds, for about 1,765 times your firm’s emissions 
are greater than 1 and less than 2. 
 
Finally, the chance for your firm of emitting greater than 6 is 30.85%, noted by the last 
cell.  It means the chance of having an emission level greater than 6 if you choose option 
A is the same as the chance of picking the balls numbered from 1 through 3,085 from a 
10, 000 ball numbered from 1 through 10,000.  In other words, if you choose 
management option A in 10,000 rounds, for about 3,085 times your firm’s emissions is 
greater than 6. 
 
In general, your firm’s emissions are more likely to be lower if you choose a 
management option with low average emissions. Likewise, your firm’s emissions are 
more likely to be higher if you choose a management option with high average 
emissions.  
 
Your firm’s emissions will result in pollution in the lake. Pollution affects the well-
being of all lake users. For example, high pollution levels affect the health of fish, 
causing losses to the fisherman. To protect the water resource, an environmental 
regulator requires you, and all other firms in your group, to pay the following Tax on 
pollution: 
 
Tax = 30 * Total Pollution  
 
Total Pollution equals the total of your firm’s emissions and the other five players’ 
emissions. In other words, the total pollution is based on the management decision of 
everyone in your group, not just your own.  
 
A round of the experiment is complete when all six players have made their management 
decision by choosing from the six management options listed on your computer screen. 
After every player makes his or her management decision, Total Pollution will be 
calculated by the computer. The Tax will be calculated using the formula above. For 
each round, your Total Earnings is calculated as follows: 
 
Total Earnings = Earnings from Production – Tax 
 
Your computer will show your Management Options, your Earnings from 
Production, the Total Pollution, the Tax and your Total Earnings from the current 
round and all previous rounds. Your computer will also show you other five players’ 
Management Options after everyone makes their decision in one round. 
 
Here is an example of how to calculate your Total Earnings. If in one round each of 
five others in your group chooses option E and has an individual emission of 2 and you 
choose option A and have an individual emission of 6, the Total Pollution will be 16. 
Everyone in your group will pay a tax that is equal to 480 experimental dollars. Your 
total earnings in this round will be 800 – 480 = 320 experimental dollars. 
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Here is another example. If in one round all of you choose option A and each of you 
have an individual emission of 6, the total pollution will be 36. Everyone in your group 
will pay a tax that is equal to 1080 experimental dollars. Your total earnings in this 
round will be 800 – 1080 = -220 experimental dollars, which means you lose 220 
experimental dollars. 
 
It is important that you understand the instructions and the experiment. We will ask you 
a few questions before you make any decisions in the experiment. The computer will 
check your answers automatically. If you do not get the correct answers after a few 
attempts, please let the experiment administrator know and he or she will be happy to 
explain them to you. 
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Please do not turn to next 
page unless experimenters 
ask you to do so. 
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Instructions (Part II) 
 
You will make another 45 decisions in this part. Everything in the game will keep the 
same except that other firms’ management option choices in your group will not be 
given to you anymore. Please also read the instructions in Part I to make any decisions 
if you need it. 
